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Paust: The Absolute Prohibition of Torture and Necessary and Appropriate

THE ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION OF TORTURE
AND NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE
SANCTIONS
Jordan J. Paust∗
I. THE PEREMPTORY PROHIBITION
Torture is a form of treatment of human beings that is absolutely
prohibited under various forms of customary and treaty-based
international law in all social contexts.1 Other forms of treatment that
are absolutely prohibited and often proscribed in the same international
instruments that outlaw torture include prohibitions of cruel, inhumane,
and degrading treatment.2 Additionally, each form of ill-treatment
constitutes a violation of peremptory rights and prohibitions jus cogens3
that trumps any inconsistent portion of an international agreement and
more ordinary forms of customary international law.4 These forms of illtreatment can never constitute lawful public acts by any state or public
official. Furthermore, as customary rights and prohibitions jus cogens,
each right and prohibition applies universally and without any
attempted limitations in reservations with respect to a particular treaty.5
∗
Mike & Teresa Baker Law Center Professor, University of Houston. Thanks to Dan
Baker of our library staff for useful research.
1
See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate International Law
Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 811, 816–18,
820–22, 846 (2005) [hereinafter Paust, Executive Plans]; Jordan J. Paust, Above the Law:
Unlawful Executive Authorizations Regarding Detainee Treatment, Secret Renditions, Domestic
Spying, and Claims to Unchecked Executive Power, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 345, 360–64, 366 (2007)
[hereinafter Paust, Above the Law]; Committee Against Torture, Gen. Comm. No. 2,
Implementation of Article 2 by States parties, paras. 1, 5, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (24 Jan.
2008) [hereinafter CAT Comm. Gen. Comm.]; text infra note 67. The articles have been
revised in JORDAN J. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S UNLAWFUL
RESPONSES IN THE “WAR” ON TERROR (2007) [hereinafter PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW]. Since
there is no necessity or other exception, as a matter of law, there is no necessity defense.
2
See, e.g., Paust, Executive Plans, supra note 1, at 816–22, 835, 845–46. See PAUST, BEYOND
THE LAW, supra note 1, at 30-31. This is why it is inadequate for a government to state
merely that it does not allow torture. Such a statement was part of a repeated ploy of the
Bush Administration despite the fact that any lawyer in the Administration who was not
professionally irresponsible would have known that inhumane treatment of any person
under any circumstance is unlawful. Id.
3
See, e.g., id. at 821 & nn.39–40; RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 702(d), cmnt. n (3d ed. 1987).
4
With respect to the nature of jus cogens norms, see, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, JON M. VAN
DYKE, LINDA A. MALONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 61–63 (2d ed.
2005); CAT Comm. Gen. Comm., supra note 1, para. 1.
5
See, e.g., Paust, Executive Plans, supra note 1, at 822–23.
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As customary human rights prohibitions, they also apply universally
and in all social contexts as part of the legal obligation of all members of
the United Nations under the United Nations Charter to ensure
“universal respect for, and observance of, human rights. . . .”6
In December 2007, the United Nations General Assembly reaffirmed
nearly unanimous and consistent patterns of legal expectation or opinio
juris,7 stating that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment[;]”8 that freedom from
such unlawful treatment “is a non-derogable right that must be
protected under all circumstances, including in times of international or
internal armed conflict or disturbance[;]”9 and, that “a number of
international, regional and domestic courts . . . have recognized that the
prohibition of torture is a peremptory norm of international law and
have held that the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment is customary international law[.]”10 Stressing the
absolute prohibition of torture and other outlawed forms of ill-treatment,
the General Assembly condemned “all forms” of such “treatment or
See, e.g., U.N. Charter, arts. 55(c), 56; Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance With the
Charter of the United Nations, U.N. G.A. Res. 2625 (Oct. 24, 1970), 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971) (“Every State has the duty to promote through joint
and separate action universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in accordance with the Charter.”); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d
Cir. 1980), observing with respect to Articles 55(c) and 56 of the Charter that
the guaranties include, at a bare minimum, the right to be free from
torture. This prohibition has become part of customary international
law, as evidenced and defined by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, General Assembly Resolution 217 (III)(A) (Dec. 10, 1948) which
states, in the plainest of terms, ‘no one shall be subjected to torture.’
The General Assembly has declared that the Charter precepts
embodied in this Universal Declaration ‘constitute basic principles of
international law.’Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV)
(Oct. 24, 1970) [the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International
Law]).
Id.
7
Concerning the nature of opinio juris as an element of customary international law, see,
e.g., PAUST, VAN DYKE, MALONE, supra note 4, at 4, 29–30, 42–43, 46–48, 93–94, 102–03, 105.
8
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. G.A.
Res. 62/148, prmbl. (18 Dec. 2007), U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/148 (4 Mar. 2008). A 2008
resolution with the same title reaffirmed this and the three points that appear here in the
text at notes 9–11. See U.N. G.A. Res. 63/166, prmbl. (18 Dec. 2008), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/63/166 (19 Feb. 2009). Similar prior resolutions with the same name reaffirmed
many of the same points. See, e.g., U.N. G.A. Res. 61/153, pmbl. (19 Dec. 2006), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/153 (14 Feb. 2007); U.N. G.A. Res. 60/148 (16 Dec. 2005), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/148 (21 Feb. 2006).
9
U.N. G.A. Res. 62/148, supra note 8, pmbl.
10
Id. pmbl.
6
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punishment, including . . . intimidation,” and reiterated the fundamental
expectation of the international community that such forms of illtreatment “are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever and can thus never be justified[.]”11 One year earlier, the
General Assembly had reaffirmed that “States are under the obligation to
protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms of all persons[]”12
and that “States must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism
complies with their obligations under international law, in particular[,]
international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law[.]”13
II. CRIMES OF TORTURE AND SANCTION DUTIES
With respect to the obligation of every state to enforce such rights
and prohibitions and the criminal nature of such forms of ill-treatment,
the General Assembly has condemned “any action or attempt . . . to
legalize, authorize or acquiesce in torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment . . . under any circumstances, including on grounds
of national security or through judicial decisions[.]”14 The General
Assembly stressed that allegations that such forms of ill-treatment have
occurred “must be promptly and impartially examined . . . [and with
respect to nonimmunity and the duty to prosecute,] those who
encourage, order, tolerate or perpetrate acts of torture must be held
responsible, brought to justice . . . and severely punished, including the
officials in charge of the place of detention[.]”15 The General Assembly
Id. ¶ 1.
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering
Terrorism, U.N. G.A. Res. 61/171, pmbl. (19 Dec. 2006), U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/171 (1 Mar.
2007). The same language appeared in a 2008 resolution by the same title. U.N. G.A. Res.
63/185, prmbl. (18 Dec. 2008), U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/185 (3 Mar. 2009).
13
Id. ¶ 1. The same language appears in a 2008 resolution. See U.N. G.A. Res. 63/185,
supra note 12, prmbl. The 2006 resolution used the same language that appeared in a 2004
resolution with the same title. G.A. Res. 59/191, para. 1 (Dec. 20, 2004), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/59/191 (Mar. 10, 2005). See also Human Rights and Terrorism, U.N. G.A. Res.
59/195, pmbl. (Dec. 20, 2004) (which states, in part, “Reaffirming that all measures to
counter terrorism must be in strict conformity with international law, including
international human rights standards and obligations[]”) U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/195 (Mar.
22, 2005).
14
U.N. G.A. Res. 63/166, supra note 8, at para. 5; G.A. Res. 62/148, supra note 8, ¶ 4.
15
U.N. G.A. Res. 63/166, supra note 8, at para. 6. See also id. para. 17 (“[c]alls upon State
parties to the . . . [CAT] to fulfil their obligation to submit for prosecution or extradite those
alleged to have committed acts of torture”); U.N. G.A. Res. 62/148, supra note 8, at para. 5.
See also Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, Annex, part III, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/147/Annex (Mar. 21, 2006), stating the following:
In cases of gross violations of international human rights law and
11
12
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also emphasized that during armed conflict “acts of torture . . . are
serious violations of international humanitarian law and . . . constitute
war crimes[]” and that perpetrators “must be prosecuted and
punished[.]” Moreover, these acts can also constitute “crimes against
humanity”16—a point evident in the customary post-World War II
charters and laws created for prosecution of customary crimes against
humanity in the international criminal tribunals at Nuremberg and
Tokyo and in numerous fora that operated in Europe under Control
Council Law No. 10, which crimes expressly included torture and “other
inhumane acts[.]”17
The General Assembly also took note of the fact that “prolonged
incommunicado detention or detention in secret places can facilitate the
perpetration of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment and can in itself constitute a form of such treatment[.]”18
In 2006, in response to unlawful conduct authorized by President Bush
and others in his administration,19 the Committee Against Torture,
which operates under the auspices of the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

serious violations of international humanitarian law constituting
crimes under international law, States have the duty to investigate and,
if there is sufficient evidence, the duty to submit to prosecution the
person allegedly responsible for the violations and, if found guilty, the
duty to punish her or him.
Id. U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (21 Mar. 2006); Office High Comm’n H.R. [OHCHR] Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Res. 32, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/RES/1999/32 (26 Apr. 1999); Office High Comm’n H.R. [OHCHR], Res. 1999/1 (6
Apr. 1999), quoted in Martin Scheinin, Yuji Iwasawa, Andrew C. Byrnes, & Menno T.
Kamminga, Final Report on the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human
Rights Offenses 7, INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE (London 2000); infra
notes 26–28, 31–32.
16
G.A. Res. 62/148, supra note 8, ¶ 6. Prosecution of torture as a crime against humanity
has occurred in the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). See, e.g.,
The Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, and Vukovic, ICTY-96-23/1-T (Trial Chamber, 22 Feb.
2001).
17
See, e.g., U.N. HCR, Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg,
Annex to the London Agreement, art. 6(c) (Aug. 8, 1945) (“other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population[] . . . .”); Charter for the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East (Tokyo Charter), art. 5(c), as amended by General Orders No. 20 (Apr. 26, 1946)
(“other inhumane acts committed . . . before or during the war[]”); Allied Control Council
Law No. 10, art. II(1)(c), (Dec. 20, 1945) (“torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population[] . . . .”); Control Council for Germany, OFFICIAL GAZETTE
50 (Jan. 31, 1946).
18
U.N. G.A. Res. 63/166, supra note 8, at para. 20; G.A. Res. 62/148, supra note 8, ¶ 15.
See also G.A. Res. 61/153, supra note 8, ¶ 12.
19
See, e.g., Paust, Executive Plans, supra note 1, at 812, 824–51; Paust, Above the Law, supra
note 1, at 345–59.
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(CAT),20 recognized that “secret detention . . . constitutes, per se, a
violation of the Convention[]” and that “enforced disappearance [a
previously widely recognized crime against humanity under customary
international law]21 . . . constitutes, per se, a violation of the
Convention.”22 The Committee Against Torture also declared that
“detaining persons indefinitely without charge, constitutes per se a
violation of the Convention[.]”23
Also in 2006, the United Nations Security Council reaffirmed “its
condemnation in the strongest terms of all acts of violence or abuses
committed against civilians in situations of armed conflict . . . in

20
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. [hereinafter CAT].
21
With respect to the crime against humanity known as forced disappearance and
involving a refusal to disclose either the name or whereabouts of a detainee, see, e.g., Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7(1)(i), (2)(i) (forced disappearance is a
crime against humanity); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 1, 2002,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute of the ICC]; International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, pmbl., adopted by G.A. Res. 61/177,
U.N. Doc. A/61/177 (Dec. 20, 2006); 22 U.S.C. § 2304(d) (“causing the disappearance of
persons” is among “flagrant” and “gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights”); S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 9 (1991), quoted in Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 172; The
Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, ICTY-95-16-T (Trial Chamber, Judgment, 14 Jan. 2000); In re
Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994); Bowoto v. Chevron
Corp., No. C99-02506 SI, 2007 WL 2349336 at *29 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2007) (“there is
sufficient circumstantial evidence of . . . forced disappearance [in Nigeria] to support tort
claims”); Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401, 416, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Xuncax v.
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184–85 (D. Mass. 1995); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707,
710–12 (N.D. Cal. 1988); 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (2000); Inter-American Convention on the
Forced Disappearance of Persons, art. II, June 9, 1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1529, 1529
(1994); Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Res. 1433, Lawfulness of Detentions by the
United States in Guantanamo Bay, paras. 7(vi), 8(vii)–(viii) (26 Apr. 2005); JEAN-MARIE
HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW:
RULES 340–43, 421, 439 (ICRC 2005); Jose E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 175, 199, 210–11, 213 (2006); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Institutionalization of Torture
Under the Bush Administration, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 389, 411–13 (2006); Maureen R.
Berman, Roger C. Clark, State Terrorism: Disappearances, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 531, 531 (1982);
Jordan J. Paust, Post-9/11 Overreaction and Fallacies Regarding War and Defense, Guantanamo,
the Status of Persons, Treatment, Judicial Review of Detention, and Due Process in Military
Commissions, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1335, 1352–56 (2004); Leila Nadya Sadat, Ghost
Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition Under International Law, 57 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 309 (2006).
22
U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under
Article 19 of the Convention: Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture,
United States of America, ¶¶ 17–18, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (May, 18 2006), available
at http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/AdvanceVersions/CAT.C.USA.CO.2.
pdf [hereinafter CAT Report].
23
Id. ¶ 22.
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particular . . . torture
and
other
prohibited
treatment . . . .”24
Additionally, the Security Council demanded that all parties to an armed
conflict “comply strictly with the obligations applicable to them under
international law, in particular those contained in the Hague
Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and in the Geneva Conventions of
1949 . . . .”25 The Security Council also stressed “the responsibility of
States to comply with their relevant obligations to end impunity and to
prosecute those responsible for war crimes, genocide, crimes against
humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law[,]”26
which can include the use of torture and cruel and inhumane treatment.
S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006).
Id. ¶ 6. See also S.C. Res. 1566, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004) (States
must “ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with all their
obligations under international law . . . in particular international human rights, refugee,
and humanitarian law[]”).
26
S.C. Res. 1674, supra note 24, ¶ 8; see also S.C. Res. 1820, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820
(June 19, 2008) (“Reaffirming also the resolve expressed in the 2005 World Summit Outcome
Document to eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls, including by ending
impunity . . .”); ¶ 4 which states,
[R]ape and other forms of sexual violence can constitute a war crime, a
crime against humanity, or a constitutive act with respect to genocide,
stresses the need for the exclusion of sexual violence crimes from
amnesty provisions . . . and calls upon Member States to comply with
their obligations for prosecuting persons responsible for such
acts . . . and stresses the importance of ending impunity for such
acts . . .
Id. See also S.C. Res. 1261, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1261 (Aug. 25, 1999) (stressing “the
responsibility of all States to bring an end to impunity and their obligation to prosecute
those responsible for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions . . . ” which include the use
of torture). Concerning the customary international legal responsibility of all states aut
dedere aut judicare to either initiate prosecution of or to extradite all persons reasonably
accused of such crimes and other violations of customary international criminal law, see,
e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 10, 12,
131–44, 155, 169 (3d ed. 2007); RUDIGER WOLFRUM & DIETER FLECK, ENFORCEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, reprinted in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW, 683–84 (Dieter Fleck Ed., 2d ed. 2008). See also supra notes 15–16; infra
notes 28, 31–32 and accompanying text. Fulfillment of such legal requirements clearly
would not be political. In fact, in the United States it is a presidential duty as well as that of
a relatively independent Attorney General. See infra note 121.
Under international law, all states have the competence to prosecute such crimes; this
is termed universal jurisdiction. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 404; PAUST,
BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra at 155–74; JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 420–23, 432–41 (2d ed. 2003); PAUST, supra note 1, at 49, 167 n.155; Marlise
Simons, Spanish Court Weighs Criminal Inquiry on Torture for 6 Bush-Era Officials, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 29, 2009, at A6 (Spanish jurisdiction regarding at least complicity of Gonzales, Yoo,
Addington, Feith, Bybee, and Haynes with respect to violations of Geneva law and the
CAT at Guantanamo Bay would rest partly on universal jurisdiction.). Such a competence
(as well as the duty to prosecute) was recognized early in U.S. history. See, e.g., United
States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 197 (1820) (“Robbery on the seas is considered as
24
25
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Article 146 of the 1949 Geneva Civilian Convention27 expressly and
unavoidably requires that all Parties, including the United States,
“search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be
committed, . . . grave breaches [of the Convention], and shall bring such
persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts” for
“effective penal sanctions” or, “if it prefers, . . . hand such persons over
for trial to another High Contracting Party . . . .”28 The obligation is
absolute and applies with respect to alleged perpetrators of any status.
As a party to the Geneva Conventions, the United States must either
initiate prosecution or extradite an alleged perpetrator to another state
or, today, render an accused to the International Criminal Court. “Grave

an offence within the criminal jurisdiction of all nations. It is against all, and punished by
all . . . within this universal jurisdiction.”); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153,
161, 163 (1820) (piracy is “an offence against the universal law of society”); United States v.
Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144, 147–48 (1820) (Piracy “is an offense against all. It is
punishable in the Courts of all . . . [our courts] are authorized and bound to punish[.]”);
Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 159–60 (1795) (Iredell, J.) (“[A]ll . . . trespasses against
the general law of nations, are enquirable and may be proceeded against in any nation
where no special exemption can be maintained, either by the general law of nations, or by
some treaty which forbids or restrains it.”), quoted in The Divina Pastora, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 52, 65 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.); Ross v. Rittenhouse, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 160, 162 (Pa. 1792)
(“universal law”); Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 113, 115 (Pa. 1784)
(assault against a foreign consul is a “crime against the whole world,” a “crime against all
other nations,” and it is “the interest as well as the duty of the government, to animadvert
upon . . . conduct [in violation of the law of nations] with becoming severity”); Ex parte dos
Santos, 7 F. Cas. 949, 953 (C.C.D. Va. 1835) (No. 4,016) (In his writings, Vattel noted the
“duty of the sovereign to prevent . . . and the consequent duty to punish of surrender[.]”);
United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 847–51 (C.C.D. Mass. 1821) (No. 15,551
(With respect to “an offence against the universal law of society,” “no nation can rightly
permit its subjects to carry it on, or exempt them . . . [and] no nation can privilege itself to
commit a crime against the law of nations.”); 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 515 (1821) (“Crimes against
the human family” are prosecutable by “[a]ll nations[]”); 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 68, 69 (1797) (a
“violation of territorial rights . . . [is] an offence against the law of nations . . . [and] it is the
interest as well as the duty of every government to punish”). Universal jurisdiction also
provides a jurisdictional basis for support of any state’s request for extradition. If a state
cannot prosecute, its duty shifts to a duty to extradite.
27
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC].
28
GC, supra note 27, at art. 146. See also HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 21, at
606–11; 4 COMMENTARY, GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN
PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 587, 590, 597, 602 (ICRC, Jean S. Pictet ed. 1958); U.S. Dep’t Army,
FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 178, para. 499 (“The term ‘war crime’ is the
technical expression for a violation of the law of war by any person or persons, military or
civilian. Every violation of the law of war is a war crime[.]”), 181, ¶ 506(b) (The
requirements set forth in GC art. 146 “are declaratory of the obligation of belligerents under
customary international law to take measures for the punishment of war crimes committed
by all persons, including members of a belligerent’s own armed forces.”) (1956).
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breaches” of the Convention include “torture or inhuman treatment[]”29
and transfer of a non-prisoner of war from occupied territory.30
Similarly, Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention Against Torture
expressly and unavoidably requires that a party to the treaty “under
whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have committed . . . [for example,
torture or ‘complicity or participation in torture,’ is found, ‘shall,’] if it
does not extradite him, submit the case to its competent authorities for
the purpose of prosecution.”31 There are no other alternatives.
When 160 states met in Rome in 1998 to create the International
Criminal Court (ICC), they emphasized that there is a lack of immunity
for international crimes such as genocide, other crimes against humanity,
and war crimes, and affirmed the universal duty to end impunity and
prosecute alleged perpetrators of such crimen contra omnes in
international and domestic courts. For example, the preamble to the
Statute of the ICC declares emphatically “that the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole must not go
unpunished and . . . their effective prosecution must be ensured by
taking measures at the national level . . . ,” expresses the determination
of the community “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of
these crimes . . . ,” and recalls the fact “that it is the duty of every State to
exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international
crimes . . . .”32
With respect to Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights,33 which mirrors customary human rights law and
absolutely prohibits any form of torture and cruel, inhumane, and
degrading treatment of any human being under any circumstances,34 the
Human Rights Committee that functions under the auspices of the treaty
had declared as early as 1982 that “[c]omplaints about ill-treatment must
be investigated . . . [and] [t]hose found guilty must be held
responsible[.]”35
Ten years later, the Committee reiterated the
Id. at art. 147.
Id. at arts. 49, 147; infra note 97.
31
CAT, supra note 20, at art. 7(1).
32
Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 21, at pmbl.
33
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec. 9, 1966)
[hereinafter ICCPR].
34
ICCPR, supra note 33, art. 7. Regarding the customary and non-derogable nature of
such rights and prohibitions, see, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 820–21. The obligations also
apply wherever the U.S. exercises effective control over a person of any status. See, e.g., id.
at 142–43 n.40, 183–84 n.40. The same obligations apply through the U.N. Charter and are
similarly universal. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. The obligations under the
CAT are also universal. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 173 n.1, 187 n.43, 199–200 n.145.
35
Office High Comm’n H.R., Report of the H.R. Comm., General Comment No. 7, ¶1, 37
U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 40, Annex V, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/Add.1/963 (May 5, 1982).
29
30
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requirement that those who violate Article 7, “whether [acts are]
committed by public officials or other persons acting on behalf of the
State, or by private persons[,]”36 and “whether by encouraging, ordering,
tolerating or perpetrating prohibited acts, must be held responsible.”37
The Committee added that the State parties to the treaty have a duty to
afford protection whether such acts are “inflicted by people acting in
their official capacity, outside their official capacity[,] or in a private
capacity.”38
A striking feature of every international criminal law treaty is that
there is no recognition of any form of immunity for official elites. In fact,
Article 27 of the Statute of the ICC expressly affirms that “official
capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government
or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in
no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility” and that
“[i]mmunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official
capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall
not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction . . . .”39
III. TYPES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR TORTURE
At least four general types of criminal responsibility exist under
international law with respect to torture and other outlawed treatment.
First, it is obvious that direct perpetrators of violations of the Geneva
36
H.R. Comm., General Comment No. 20, ¶ 13, at 29–32, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1 (Oct.
10, 1992). See also infra note 65 (concerning private duties under human rights law).
37
Id. ¶ 13. As noted above, the responsibility to prosecute has been emphasized by the
U.N. General Assembly and Security Council. See, e.g., supra notes 15–16, 26 and
accompanying text.
38
Id. ¶ 2.
39
Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 21, art. 27(1)–(2). See also The Prosecutor v.
Milosevic, ICTY-99-37-PT, ¶¶ 26–34 (Nov. 8, 2001) (the lack of immunity of heads of state
for war crimes, genocide, and other crimes against humanity that is reflected in Article 7 of
the Statute of the ICTY “reflects a rule of customary international law[]”); infra notes 59–60;
text infra note 62 (perpetrators under the CAT who are not immune expressly include “a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity[]”). The ICC’s recognition that
domestic immunities cannot obviate jurisdiction of the Court is an affirmation of the fact
that under international law, no limiting domestic laws, amnesties, pardons, or grants of
immunity would be entitled to any legal effect in another state or in any international
forum. See, e.g., The Prosecutor v. Furundzija, ICTY-95-17/1-T (Dec. 10, 1998), paras. 153–
55 (stating that “national measures authorising [sic] or condoning torture or absolving its
perpetrators through an amnesty law[]” would have no affect internationally); PAUST, supra
note 1, at 202 n.150; PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 26, at 30, 34, 127–28, 132–34, 137–
40, 163, 821; infra note 85. Furthermore, if legally operative limitations exist under domestic
law of a particular state, its duty shifts from the duty to initiate prosecution to a duty to
extradite or render an accused to an international tribunal. See also supra note 26; text infra
notes 109–11.
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Conventions, other laws of war, the Convention Against Torture, and
crimes against humanity (such as forced disappearance of persons) have
direct liability. Leaders who issue authorizations, directives, findings,
and orders that instruct others to commit acts that constitute
international crimes, such as former President Bush and former Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld, may also be prosecuted as direct perpetrators of
crimes.40
Second, any person who aids and abets torture is liable as an aider
and abettor before the fact, during the fact, or after the fact.41 Liability
exists whether or not the person knows that his or her conduct is
criminal or whether or not the conduct of the direct perpetrator of
torture is criminal or even constitutes torture.42 Under customary
international law, an aider and abettor need only be aware that his or her
conduct (which can include inaction) would or does assist a direct

See, e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 26, at 32, 35, 51-73. See also infra notes 69–
72, 76, 78–80, 101–02. This and the next three paragraphs of this Article are borrowed from
Jordan J. Paust, Prosecuting the President and His Entourage, 14 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 539,
542–43 (2008). The following form of responsibility has been applied to cabinet officials:
A member of a Cabinet which collectively, as one of the principal
organs of the Government, is responsible for the care of prisoners is
not absolved from responsibility if, having knowledge of the
commission of crimes . . . and omitting or failing to secure the taking of
measures to prevent the commission of such crimes in the future, he
elects to continue as a member of the Cabinet. This is the position even
though the Department of which he is in charge is not directly
concerned with the care of prisoners. A Cabinet member may resign.
If he has knowledge of ill-treatment of prisoners, is powerless to
prevent future ill-treatment, but elects to remain in the Cabinet thereby
continuing to participate in its collective responsibility for protection of
prisoners he willingly assumes responsibility for any ill-treatment in
the future.
Judgment of International Military Tribunal for the Far East (1948), reprinted in PAUST,
BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 26, at 53.
41
See, e.g., CAT, supra note 20, art. 4(1); PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 26, at 35, 44–
49; PAUST, supra notes 1, at 18, 24, 30, 165, 167, 185, 193, 199, 277.
42
See, e.g., Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 21, arts. 25(3)(c)–(d), 30, 32(2). See also
Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. ICTY 95-14/2-A, Judgment, ¶ 311 (Dec. 17, 2004)
(more generally, an accused need not know the “specific legal definition of each element of
a crime . . . . It suffices that he was aware of the [relevant] factual circumstances . . . .”);
Guenael Mettraux, Crimes Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 237, 297 n.323 (2002)
(regarding the factual quality, the accused “need not have known that his or her
act . . . amounted to an ‘inhumane act’ either in the legal or moral sense.”); CAT Comm.
Gen. Comm., supra note 1, para. 9 (“[E]lements of intent and purpose in article 1 do not
involve a subjective inquiry into the motivations of the perpetrators, but rather must be
objective determinations under the circumstances[.]”).
40
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perpetrator or facilitates conduct that is criminal.43 In any case,
ignorance of the law is no excuse. Especially relevant in this respect are
the criminal memoranda and behavior of various German lawyers in the
German Ministry of Justice, high level executive positions outside the
Ministry, and the courts in the 1930s and 1940s that were addressed in
informing detail in United States v. Altstoetter (The Justice Case).44
Clearly, several memo writers and others during the Bush
Administration abetted the “common, unifying” plan to use “coercive
interrogation[,]” and their memos and conduct substantially facilitated
its effectuation.45 Therefore, prosecution or extradition of several
members of the former Bush Administration for criminal complicity
would be on firm ground.
Third, individuals can also be prosecuted for participation in a “joint
criminal enterprise,”46 which the International Criminal Tribunal for
Former Yugoslavia has recognized can exist in at least two relevant
forms: (1) where all the accused “voluntarily participated in one of the
aspects of the common plan” and “intended the criminal result [whether
or not they knew it was a crime], even if not physically perpetrating the

See, e.g., Almog v. Arab Bank, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 286–87 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Prosecutor
v. Blaskic, Case No. ICTY-95-14-T-A, Judgment, ¶ 50 (July 29, 2004) (“If he is aware that one
of a number of crimes will probably be committed, and one of those crimes is in fact
committed, he has intended to facilitate . . . that crime, and is guilty as an aider and
abettor.”); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. ICTY-95-17/1-T, Judgment ¶ ¶ 236, 236–38,
245–46, 249 (Dec 10, 1998) (requiring only “mere knowledge that his actions assist”);
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgment, ¶ 39 (Sept. 4, 1998) (complicity
included refusals to oppose criminal conduct during “meetings of the Council of Ministers,
cabinet meetings and meetings of prefets where the course of . . . [illegal conduct was]
actively followed” and use of directives that “encouraged and reinforced” conduct that was
criminal); see supra text accompanying note 37. At the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East concerning the Trial of Koiso, an ex-Prime Minister, guilt was established
where the accused knew that treatment of prisoners “left much to be desired” and he had
asked for a full inquiry but did not resign from office or act more affirmatively to stop
illegal treatment. 2 JUDGMENT OF THE IMT FOR THE FAR EAST 1778–79 (1948). Cf. Rome
Statute of the ICC, supra note 21, art. 25(3)(c) (“For the purpose of facilitating the
commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists . . . .”). The forms of criminal
complicity recognized in Kambanda and Koiso seem to be particularly relevant to meetings
of former Vice President Cheney and other high level officials of the Bush Administration
in the White House during 2002 and 2003. See infra notes 76–77.
44
See U.S. v. Altstoetter (The Justice Case); 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 1058 (1951).
45
See, e.g., infra notes 76–80, 86–102. See also Simons, supra note 26 (possible indictments
of Gonzales, Yoo, Addington, Feith, Bybee, and Haynes).
46
See, e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 26, at 32, 37–38; Allison Marston Danner,
Joint Criminal Enterprise, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCEMENT 483 (M. Cherif
Bassiouni ed., 3 ed, 2008).
43
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crime[;]”47 and (2) where “(i) the crime charged was a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the execution of that enterprise, and (ii) the
accused was aware that such a crime was a possible consequence of the
execution of that enterprise, and, with that awareness participated in the
enterprise.”48
Fourth, civilian or military leaders with de facto or de jure authority,
such as former President Bush and former Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld, can also be liable for dereliction of duty with respect to acts of
torture engaged in by subordinates when the leader (1) knew or should
have known that subordinates were about to commit, were committing,
or had committed international crimes; (2) the leader had an opportunity
to act; and (3) the leader failed to take reasonable corrective action, such
as ordering a halt to criminal activity or initiating a process for
prosecution of all subordinates reasonably accused of criminal conduct.49
IV. THE RIGHT TO FAIR COMPENSATION
In 2007 and 2008, the United Nations General Assembly stressed that
“national legal systems must ensure that victims of torture and other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment obtain redress,
are awarded fair and adequate compensation and receive appropriate
social and medical rehabilitation.”50 In 2005, the U.N. General Assembly
had provided further detail concerning the right to an effective judicial
remedy for victims of violations of human rights law51 and the type of
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. ICTY-99-36-T, Judgment, n.697 (Sept. 1,
2004). Concerning the Bush Administration’s “common, unifying” plan to deny rights and
protections under international law and to use unlawful interrogation tactics, see, e.g., infra
notes 69–72, 76–80, 86–102.
48
Id. ¶ 265; Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. ICTY-95-14-T-A, Judgment, ¶ 50 (July 29,
2004).
49
See, e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 26, at 51–89. The President of the United
States and the Secretary of Defense, among others, have de jure command authority.
Furthermore, this type of leader responsibility for dereliction of duty is part of customary
international law that is part of the supreme law of the land in the United States. It has also
been incorporated by reference in 10 U.S.C. § 818 (2000), which incorporates all violations
of the laws of war as offenses against the laws of the United States. See, e.g., infra note 106.
Leader responsibility incorporated through such a statute (then, through the same
language found in the 1916 Articles of War) was recognized by the Supreme Court. In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1946); see also Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. ICTY-96-21-T,
Judgment, ¶ 338 (Nov. 16, 1998). It has also been used with respect to civil sanctions
against leaders. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242 (2d Cir. 1995); Xuncax v.
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 171–72 (D. Mass. 1995); PAUST, VAN DYKE, MALONE, supra note
4, at 25, 367–70, 373, 382, 385–88, 440, 449.
50
U.N. G.A. Res. 63/166, supra note 8, at para. 18; Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 62/148, supra note 8, ¶ 13.
51
Basic Principles, supra note 15, ¶ 12.
47

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss4/1

Paust: The Absolute Prohibition of Torture and Necessary and Appropriate

2009]

The Absolute Prohibition of Torture

1547

“[a]dequate, effective and prompt reparation,” compensation,
rehabilitation, and “[s]atisfaction” required under international law.52
The mandatory duty to provide fair compensation is set forth in
Article 14 of the Convention Against Torture:
Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the
victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an
enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation,
including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible.
In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an
act of torture, his dependents shall be entitled to
compensation.53
Similar rights to an effective remedy, access to courts, and nonimmunity are guaranteed in Articles 2(3)(a) and 14(1) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as emphasized in General
Comments of the Human Rights Committee that operates under the
auspices of the Covenant.54 They had also been reflected previously in
Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,55 which had
mirrored customary patterns of expectation concerning customary roots
of the right to an effective remedy in domestic courts for violations of
human rights and other rights under international law.56
Within the United States, Justice Breyer has recognized more
generally that universal jurisdiction with respect to “torture, genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes[] . . . necessarily contemplates

See id. at ¶¶ 15–22.
CAT, supra note 20, art. 14(1).
54
See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 33, arts. 2(3)(a), 14(1); Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12
S.W.3d 71, 82 (Tex. 2000) (“Article 14(1) requires all signatory countries to confer the right
of equality before the courts to citizens of all other signatories . . . [t]he Covenant not only
guarantees foreign citizens equal treatment in the signatories’ courts, but also guarantees
them equal access to these courts.”); PAUST, VAN DYKE, MALONE, supra note 4, at 82–83,
340–42. Article 50 of the Covenant further mandates that all of “[t]he provisions of the
present Covenant shall extend to all parts of federated States without any limitations or
exceptions,” thereby assuring that rights and duties under the treaty apply with respect to
decisions and conduct in Washington, D.C. as well as in judicial proceedings within the
United States. As part of human rights law, rights to an effective remedy and access to
courts are also necessarily part of the U.N. Charter-based obligations of all members of the
U.N. to assure “universal respect for, and observance of,” human rights. See also supra note
6.
55
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at art. 8, U.N. Doc. A/810
(Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national
tribunals for acts violating [human rights] . . . .”).
56
See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 26, at 224–29.
52
53
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a significant degree of civil tort recovery,”57 and a remarkable number of
U.S. cases have recognized the right to civil remedies for torture and/or
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.58 Several cases have also
57
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2783 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
58
See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996); Abebe-Jira
v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242–43, 245 (2d Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965
F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1017 (1993); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F.
Supp. 2d 289, 305–06 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Cabello Barrueto v. Larios, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1333
(S.D. Fla. 2002); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1344–49 (N.D. Ga. 2002);
Estate of Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1360–61 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Jama
v. I.N.S., 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 363 (D.N.J. 1998); Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp.
3, 8 (D.D.C. 1998) (including that covered under common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions); In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 910 F. Supp.
1460, 1462–63 (D. Haw. 1995); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 187 (D. Mass. 1995);
Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993); see also PAUST, supra note 1, at 165 n.154; infra
notes 69, 72–73; Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law:
A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L
REV. RED CROSS 175, 196 (2005) (“[A] State is responsible for violations of international
humanitarian law . . . and is required to make full reparation for the loss or injury caused
by such violations[.]”).
Section 5 of the 2006 Military Commissions Act (MCA) attempts to deny use by any
person of “the Geneva Conventions or any protocols thereto in any . . . civil action or
proceeding to which the United States, or a current or former officer, employee, member of
the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States is a party as a source of rights in any
court of the United States or its States or territories.” Pub. L. No. 109–366, 120 Stat. 2600,
2631–32 (2006) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(2000)) [hereinafter MCA]. Importantly, the
language does not attempt to deny use of customary international law reflected in Geneva
law, deny use of the 1907 Hague Convention No. IV on the laws of war, deny use of any
other customary laws of war, deny use of related treaty-based or customary human rights
law, deny use of Article 14 of the Convention Against Torture, or deny use of any other
federal statute as a “source of rights,” e.g., the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (2000) or Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992); Antiterrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2000). In any event, it is clear that
Congress has no power to obviate the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. See also
Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. 307, 314 (1810) (“The appellate powers of this court
are . . . [not created by statute but] are given by the constitution.”); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
548 U.S. 557, 575 (2006) (citing Durousseau). Concerning the attempted reach of the 2006
Act, see also Paust, Above the Law, supra note 1, at 414–15.
Congress has no power to violate the separation of powers by such a
blatant denial of a constitutionally mandated, traditional, and essential
judicial power to implement treaty law of the United States that, as the
Constitution expressly requires, ‘shall extend to all cases . . . arising
under . . . treaties.
Id. (ellipses in original).
The violation of the separation of powers in this instance is especially
evident where federal courts have continuing jurisdiction in all cases
arising under treaties and Congress attempts to substantially inhibit
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recognized the unavoidable fact that violations of international criminal
law and human rights law cannot be lawful “official” or “public” acts of
the state and are not entitled to immunity.59 As the International
judicial independence by controlling the results in certain cases.
Congress is attempting precisely that by prescribing rules for decision
in a particular way or, in this instance, rights and rules of law
contained in the Geneva Conventions that cannot be used for decision.
This congressional effort to deny use of particular law and to control
judicial decision of cases in a particular way is all the more blatant
where Congress has attempted to deny judicial use of common article
3 as a rule for decision in detainee cases after the Supreme Court
clearly decided that common article 3 is a primary rule for decision.
Additionally, Congress has no power to deny to the States of the
United States their shared constitutionally based duty and authority to
implement treaty law of the United States as supreme law of the land.
Id. at 415. If otherwise operative, this provision of the MCA would be trumped in any
event by the “rights under” treaties and/or the law of war exceptions to the last in time
rule documented in various Supreme Court and other federal cases. See id. at 379–80;
nn.91–92, 196, 211, 412, 418 (also addressing MCA Section 7(a)).
59
See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1210 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A]cts of racial
discrimination cannot constitute official sovereign acts,” also quoting Siderman de Blake v.
Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 718 (9th Cir. 1992) (“International law does not
recognize an act that violates jus cogens as a sovereign act[.]”)); Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408
F.3d 877, 893 (7th Cir. 2005) (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (“[O]fficials receive no immunity for
acts that violate international jus cogens human rights norms (which by definition are not
legally authorized acts).”); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 958–59 (9th Cir. 2002);
Altmann v. Republic of Argentina, 317 F.3d 954, 967 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting West v.
Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 826 (9th Cir. 1987) (“violations of international
law are not ‘sovereign’ acts”); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation
Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994) (human rights
violations, including torture, are not lawful public acts of a state); Liu v. Republic of China,
892 F.2d 1419, 1432–33 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1058 (1990) (act of state doctrine
not applied to assassination, which is not in the “public interest” and a strong international
consensus exists that it is illegal); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 2007 WL 2349345 (N.D. Cal.
2007) (quoting Siderman, quoted above in Sarei); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d at 344–35 (adjudication of genocide, war crimes, enslavement,
and torture is not barred by the act of state doctrine); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F.
Supp. 1189, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (defendant could not argue that torture fell within the
scope of his authority); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. at 176 (quoting Letelier v. Republic
of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 673 (D.D.C. 1980)) (“[T]hese actions exceed anything that might
be considered to have been lawfully within the scope of Gramajo’s official authority,” and
“assassination is ‘clearly contrary to the precepts of humanity as recognized in both
national and international law’ and so cannot be part of official’s ‘discretionary’
authority[.]”); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. at 212 (Defendant’s argument regarding “the act
of state and political question doctrines is completely devoid of merit. The acts . . . [of
torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and arbitrary detention in violation of
customary international law] hardly qualify as official public acts” and regarding the
political question doctrine, the claims present “clearly justiciable legal issues[.]”); Forti v.
Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1546 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (noting that torture, arbitrary
detention, and summary execution “are not the public official acts”); see also ICCPR, supra
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Military Tribunal at Nuremberg recognized, acts in violation of
note 33, art. 2(3)(a) (non-immunity is required by treaty because the mandated right to an
effective judicial remedy exists “notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by
persons acting in an official capacity”); CAT, supra note 20, art. 14(1) (the treaty-based
requirement of fair compensation necessarily applies to acts of public officials covered
under Article 1); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765, 789 (1950) (no form of immunity
exists for war crimes in violation of Geneva law); Berg v. British and African Steam
Navigation Co. (The Prize Ship “Appam”), 243 U.S. 124, 153–56 (1917) (jurisdiction
recognized regarding German government’s violation of the law of nations and relevant
treaties, and nonimmunity existed because “an illegal capture would be invested with the
character of a tort” [id. at 154] and jurisdiction is not obviated despite the intervention of
the German ambassador and a claim that since proceedings had been instituted in
Germany, the U.S. court should decline. Id. at 147, 152.); The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S.
(7 Wheat.) 283, 350–55 (1822) (property taken by a foreign ship of war in violation of the
law of nations is not immune and “is liable to the jurisdiction of our Courts” and if the
sovereign “comes personally within our limits, … he may become liable to judicial process
in the same way”); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d at 848 (regarding the political question
doctrine, “[i]n Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332, 337 (11th Cir.1992), we held that the
political question doctrine did not bar a tort action instituted against Nicaraguan contra
leaders [for war crimes in violation of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions].
Consequently, we reject Negewo’s contention in light of Linder”); Daventree, Ltd. v.
Republic of Azerbaijan, 349 F. Supp.2d 736, 755 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“the Act of State
doctrine only applies to valid acts of state”); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 894–95
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (
Because nations do not, and cannot under international law, claim a
right to torture . . . , a finding that a nation has committed such
acts . . . should have no detrimental effect on the policies underlying
the act of state doctrine. Accordingly, the Court need not apply the act
of state doctrine in this case[.]
); United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 847–51 (C.C.D. Mass. 1821) (No. 15,551)
(regarding “an offence against the universal law of society,” “no nation can rightly permit
its subjects to carry it on, or exempt them[,] . . . [and] no nation can privilege itself to
commit a crime against the law of nations”); S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3–4, 8 (1991) (the act of
state doctrine “applies only to ‘public’ acts, and no state commits torture as a matter of
public policy” and “[a] state that practices torture and summary execution is not one that
adheres to the rule of law. Consequently, the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) is
designed to respond to this situation by providing a civil cause of action in U.S. courts . . . ”
and “[the Senate Judiciary] committee does not intend the ‘act of state’ doctrine to provide
a shield from lawsuit”); H.R. Comm., General Comment No. 20, supra note 36, paras. 2, 13,
15 (victims have a “right to an effective remedy, including compensation” whether
violators of Article 7 were “public officials or other persons acting on behalf of the State, or
by private persons” “acting in their official capacity, outside their official capacity or in a
private capacity[]”); 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 356, 357 (1859) (“A sovereign who tramples upon the
public law of the world cannot excuse himself by pointing to a provision of his own
municipal code[.]”); PAUST, supra note 1, at 166 n.154 (also demonstrating why there should
be no substitution of the United States as the defendant in civil actions brought against
former U.S. officials regarding international crimes because under international law such
criminal conduct is outside “the scope of . . . official duties,” international law is a
recognized background for interpretation of federal statutes, and two treaties denying any
form of immunity are subsequent in time to two prior federal statutes regarding
substitution).
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international criminal law (such as violations of the laws of war) are ultra
vires or beyond the lawful authority of any state or official:
[T]he doctrine of the sovereignty of the State . . . cannot
be applied to acts which are condemned as criminal by
international law. The authors of these acts cannot
shelter themselves behind their official position . . . He
who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity
while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state if
the state in authorizing action moves outside its
competence under international law.60
As noted more particularly in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala with respect to
torture, “the torturer has become—like the pirate and slave trader before
him—hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”61
V. WHAT IS TORTURE?
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment provides a lengthy definition of
torture. Article 1, paragraph 1 of the treaty declares:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term “torture”
means any act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on
a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a
third person information or a confession, punishing him
for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based
on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity. It does not include
pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or
incidental to lawful sanctions.62

60
Judgment and Opinion, International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) (Oct. 1, 1946).
Regarding nonimmunity, see also PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 26, at 29–34, 36–43,
131–34, 138–40, 168–70, 207, 355, 427; Inter-American Convention on the Forced
Disappearance of Persons, supra note 21, art. IX; supra notes 14, 39 and accompanying text.
61
630 F.2d at 890.
62
CAT, supra note 20, art. 1(1). See also Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 21, art.
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Article 1 also acknowledges that “[t]his article is without prejudice to
any international instrument or national legislation which does or may
contain provisions of wider application.”63 Therefore, there is implicit
recognition that the treaty’s definition might be too limited. In fact,
many recognize that human rights law also prohibiting torture and cruel,
inhumane and degrading treatment64 is not limited to official
perpetrators or to those who act at their instigation or with their consent
or acquiescence and that private perpetrators can commit illegal acts of
torture.65 Most agree, however, that prohibited acts of “torture” involve
(1) an intentional act, and (2) “severe” pain or suffering, whether the
prohibition is found, for example, in the CAT, human rights law, or the
laws of war.66 The severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
does not have to be long lasting, damage health, or produce any
identifiable bodily injury.
As noted above, a widespread recognition exists that under
international law there are no exceptional circumstances that can justify
the use of torture as a matter of law. Similarly, there are no temporal or
geographic gaps with respect to the prohibition of torture and it applies
regardless of the status of the direct victim of torture, for example,
whether or not the victim is an alleged criminal, enemy, or terrorist.
7(2)(e) (similar definition of torture as a crime against humanity); 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2006)
(“‘torture’ means an act . . . specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or
suffering”).
63
CAT, supra note 20, art. 1(1).
64
See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 33, art. 7; American Convention on Human Rights, art. 5,
O.A.S. Treaty Ser. No. 36 (1969), 144 U.N.T.S. 123; American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, arts. I (“security of his person”), XXV (“humane treatment”), O.A.S. Res.
XXX (1948), O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4 Rev. (1965); Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, supra note 55, art. 5.
65
Concerning private duties under human rights law, see, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 33,
pmbl., art. 5(1); American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 64, arts. 29(a), (d),
32(1); American Declaration, supra note 64, pmbl., Ch. Two (“Duties”); Universal
Declaration, supra note 55, pmbl., arts. 1, 29(1), 30; H.R. Comm., General Comment No. 20,
supra note 36; Declaration on Measures to Eliminate Terrorism, G.A. Res. 49/60, Annex,
prmbl, U.N. Doc. A/Res/49/60 (Dec. 9, 1994) (addressing “links between terrorist groups
and drug traffickers and their paramilitary gangs, which have resorted to all types of
violence, thus . . . violating basic human rights”), ¶ 2 (“Acts, methods and practices of
terrorism . . . aim at the destruction of human rights[.]”). Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25
Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A), ¶ 149 (1978) (“[T]errorist activities . . . of individuals or of
groups . . . are in clear disregard of human rights.”); Jordan J. Paust, The Other Side of Right:
Private Duties Under Human Rights Law, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 51 (1992); Jordan J. Paust,
Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 801 (2002);
Jordan J. Paust, The Reality of Private Rights, Duties, and Participation in the International Legal
Process, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1229, 1241–45 (2004); text supra notes 36, 38.
66
See, e.g., Paust, Executive Plans, supra note 1, at 845–46 & nn.127, 129; see also Paust,
Above the Law, supra note 1, at 408 n.174, 410 n.181; supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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Article 2, paragraph 2 of the CAT is emblematic of a widely shared
understanding in this regard:
“No exceptional circumstances
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political in
stability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification
of torture.”67 Furthermore, Article 2, paragraph 3, affirms that “[a]n
order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as
a justification of torture.”68 It is simply beyond the question that an act
of torture cannot constitute a lawful sovereign or public act of any state.
VI. UNLAWFUL TACTICS USED DURING THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
Among specific interrogation tactics used on detained persons and
authorized by President Bush and/or Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary
Rice, Attorney General Ashcroft, and several others within the Bush
Administration that manifestly and unavoidably constitute torture are
water-boarding or a related inducement of suffocation,69 use of dogs to
67
CAT, supra note 20, art. 2(2). Quite clearly, war is not an excuse and the CAT
expressly applies during a war. In any event, the same prohibition applies under the laws
of war, human rights law (which also applies in time of war), the U.N. Charter (which
applies universally and in all social contexts), and customary norms jus cogens (same). See
supra notes 1–6. Importantly, there is no so-called lex specialis limitation or obviation of the
reach of any relevant treaty or customary international law regarding freedom from torture
and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. In fact, the phrase lex specialis appears in no
treaty identifying international criminal conduct and in no human rights treaty. To claim
that the CAT does not apply when the laws of war apply is patent nonsense. See PAUST,
supra note 1, at 173 n.1 (quoting the U.N. Committee Against Torture that the CAT “applies
at all times, whether in peace, war or armed conflict”), 187 n.43. Furthermore, as a matter
of law, there is no necessity defense. See also Memorandum from the Office of Legal
Counsel, Dep’t of Justice, to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, Re: Legal
Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, at 17 (Dec. 30, 2004) (noting with
respect to the U.S. torture statute that “a defendant’s motive (to protect national security,
for example) is not relevant”), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.
htm.
68
Id. art. 2(3). See also CAT Comm. Gen. Comm., supra note 1, para. 26 (“subordinates
may not seek refuge in superior authority and should be held to account individually”).
69
See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 26 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“water
torture” violates the Eighth Amendment, quoting Williams v. Boles, 841 F.2d 181, 183 (7th
Cir. 1988)); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 16 n.3 (1970) (Douglas, J., concurring) (forms of
torture include “dripping water on the head,” “intense noise to prevent sleep,” and
“threats to shoot or kill the victim”); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 669 (1962)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (“water cures” are “terror”); Abdel-Rahman v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d
444, 448 (4th Cir. 2007) (“various types of torture, including simulated drownings”
claimed); Don v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 738, 753 (9th Cir. 2007) (Wardlaw, J., dissenting)
(“methods of torture” include “near drownings,” quoting the 2001 U.S. Dep’t of State,
Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Sri Lanka); Hernandez-Barrera v. Ashcroft,
373 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 2004) (“water torture” claimed); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56,
126–27 (2d Cir. 2003) (“torture” would include “simulated drowning” if proved); United
States v. Galindo-Davalos, 215 F.3d 1338 (10th Cir. 2000) (“tehuacanazo, a form of torture
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which involves pouring a carbonated beverage into a suspect’s sinuses”); Ratnam v. I.N.S.,
154 F.3d 990, 992 (9th Cir. 1998) (“torture[,]” to extract information from a suspected
terrorist, included having the suspect “tipped upside down and his head immersed in a
drum of water”); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789, 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (“water
torture” occurred through use of a towel over the nose and mouth and water poured down
the nostrils to induce the fear of drowning); United States v. Lee, 744 F.2d 1124, 1125 (5th
Cir. 1984) (civil rights of prisoners violated when they were subjected to “water torture”);
United States v. Schmidt, 573 F.2d 1057, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 1978) (Hufstedler, J., concurring
and dissenting) (where Peruvians “forced his head into a bucket of water” and gave a
“promise of greater tortures,” confession was “extracted by torture”); Cooley v.
Weinberger, 518 F.2d 1151, 1153 (10th Cir. 1975) (“torture and abuse, including the ‘water
treatment’”); Iva Ikuko Toguri D’Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 361 (9th Cir. 1951)
(“water torture” used by Japanese during WWII); Mendoza v. I.N.S., 11 Fed. Appx. 888,
890, 2001 WL 399446 (9th Cir. 2001) (form of torture includes “‘la tina,’ involving the
repeated head-first submersion of suspected terrorists in water”); Struble v. Fountain, 2008
WL 2074151, at *3 (S.D. Miss. 2008) (“simulated drowning” is “egregious” and can warrant
punitive damages); Yousuf v. Samantar, 2007 WL 2220579, at *3 n.7 (E.D. Va. 2007)
(“[w]aterboarding is a form of torture”); Kaweesa v. Ashcroft, 345 F. Supp. 2d 79, 86 (D.
Mass. 2004) (“water torture” during Idi Amin’s regime in Uganda); In re Estate of
Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1463 (D. Haw. 1995) (“forms
of torture” include “[t]he “water cure,” where a cloth was placed over the detainee’s mouth
and nose, and water poured over it producing a drowning sensation”); Benjamin v.
Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (addressing “water torture” in prisons); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 432 F. Supp. 1278, 1281 (D.N.C. 1977) (discussing “types of
torture . . . such as . . . the water treatment”); State v. Piper, 709 S.W.2d 783, 799 (S.D. 2006)
(torture occurred when person “stripped the victim of his clothes,” “forced the victim into
freezing temperatures and snow and icy water[,]” and the victim “endured drowning
attempts”); People v. Joiner, 2006 WL 3598520 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 2006) (“drowning as a
form of torture”); People v. Devin, 93 Ill.2d 326, 348, 444 N.E.2d 102, 113 (Ill. 1982)
(discussing “torture called the ‘gag treatment’ in which some type of liquid detergent
mixed with water is poured into a person’s mouth until the individual chokes”); Fisher v.
State, 145 Miss. 116, 110 So. 361, 362 (1926) (“water cure, a specie of torture well known to
the bench and bar of the country”); White v. State, 129 Miss. 182, 91 So. 903, 904 (1922)
(“water cure” causes “pain and horror” and is “barbarous”); Commonwealth v. Chaitt, 380
Pa. 532, 555, 112 A.2d 379 (1955) (“[t]here was a time when the rack, the dungeon, the
water-cure and the thumbscrew were used”); Cavazos v. State, 143 Tex. Crim. 564, 566, 160
S.W.2d 260 (1942); Saadi v. Italy, [2008] ECHR 37201/06, para. 143 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 28,
2008) (“immersion of the head in water . . . . undoubtedly reach[es] the level of severity
required” to constitute torture); Baldeón-Garcia v. Peru, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 147, at paras. 123, 125 (Apr. 6, 2006) (treatment involving beatings and being
“submerged in water tanks” “constitutes an act of torture”); Tibi v. Ecuador, 2004 InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 114, at paras. 148-49 (Sept. 7, 2004) (where victim’s “head was
submerged in a water tank” and “victim was threatened . . . . [a]ll this is a form of torture”);
RICHARD L. LAEL, THE YAMASHITA PRECEDENT:
WAR CRIMES AND COMMAND
RESPONSIBILITY 80–84 (Scholarly Resources Inc. 1982) (documenting forms of “Japanese
torture, including the water cure,” used in the Philippines during WWII); PAUST, supra note
1, at 13, 16, 28, 43, 150, 152, 161, 173, 178–79; David Abraham, The Bush Regime from Elections
to Detentions: A Moral Economy of Carl Schmitt and Human Rights, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 249,
267 (2008) (quoting the Nazi Minister of Justice with respect to an indictment of German
accused regarding use of water torture in a concentration camp: “The nature of the assault,
especially the use of water torture, reveals a brutality and cruelty on the part of the
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create intense fear,70 threatening to kill the detainee or family members,71
and the cold cell or a related inducement of hypothermia.72 With respect
perpetrator that is alien to German sensibilities and feelings.”); Scott Horton, Kriegsraison or
Military Necessity? The Bush Administration’s Wilhelmine Attitude Towards the Conduct of War,
30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 576, 593–94 (2007) (regarding 1902 U.S. courts-martial in the
Philippines and a 1968 U.S. court-martial in Vietnam); Jamie Mayerfield, Playing By Our
Own Rules: How U.S. Marginalization of International Human Rights Law Led to Torture, 20
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 89 (2007); Manfred Nowak, What Practices Constitute Torture: US and
UN Standards, 28 HUM. RTS. Q. 809, 829 (2006) (plastic bag over the head to simulate
asphyxiation); Major Mynda G. Ohman, Integrating Title 18 War Crimes Into Title 10: A
Proposal to Amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 57 A. F. L. REV. 1, 18 nn.78–79 (2005)
(regarding 1902 U.S. courts-martial); Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History of
Water Torture in U.S. Courts, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 468 (2007) (addressing, among
others, convictions in the IMT for the Far East, Norway, the U.K. in Singapore, U.S. military
commissions after WWII, and U.S. courts-martial in the Philippines in 1902); Walter Pincus,
Waterboarding Historically Controversial; In 1947, the U.S. Called It a War Crime; In 1968, It
Reportedly Caused an Investigation, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2006, at A17; Evan Wallach,
Waterboarding Used to Be a Crime, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2007, at B1 (“After World War II, we
convicted several Japanese soldiers for waterboarding;” at the I.M.T. for the Far East, “[t]he
principal proof upon which their torture convictions were based was” water-boarding; U.S.
soldiers were “court-martialed for using the ‘water cure’” during U.S. occupation of the
Philippines during the Spanish-American War; in 1982, federal charges against a Texas
sheriff and three deputies “alleged that they conspired to ‘subject prisoners to a suffocating
water torture ordeal in order to coerce confessions[.]’”); Tactic Called Torture, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 2008, at A8 (U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour notes that
waterboarding is torture in violation of the CAT); Brian Ross & Richard Esposito, CIA’s
Harsh Interrogation Techniques Described, ABC News (Nov. 18, 2005), available at
http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Investigations/story?id=1322866; U.S. Dep’t of State, 1999
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kenya (“torture” method included
“deprivation of air by submersion of the head in water”), available at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/Kenya.html;
id.,
Libya (“torture” included “suffocating with plastic bags”); id., Russia (torture tactics
included “asphyxiation using gas masks or bags”); id., Sri Lanka (methods of torture
include “near drownings”); id., Tunisia (“torture” included “submersion of the head in
water”); id., Turkey (methods of torture include “water dripped onto the head, . . . near
suffocation by placing bags over the head”); id., Uzbekistan (torture includes “near
suffocation”); U.S. Dep’t of Army Subject Schedule 27-1, The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
Hague Convention No. IV of 1907, at 7 (Oct. 8, 1970) (illegal means of interrogation of a
detainee include “dunking his head into a barrel of water, or putting a plastic bag over his
head to make him talk,” adding, “No American soldier can commit these brutal acts, nor
permit his fellow soldiers to do so.”); infra note 76, 83. Quoted language from the 1999
Country Reports cited in this footnote and infra notes 71–72 is essentially the same in the
State Department’s 2002 and 2003 Country Reports with the exception of Egypt infra note
72) and most appear in the 2004 Reports. These can be compared through the website
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt.
70
See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 12–16, 25–27, 43, 155, 159–62, 173–75, 256; Bob
Woodward, Detainee Tortured, Says U.S. Official, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2009, at A1 (noting
that Susan J. Crawford, the convening authority of the GTMO military commissions,
dropped charges against Mohammed al-Qahtani because “[h]is treatment met the legal
definition of torture,” which involved a combination of threatening “with a military
working dog,” stripping naked, subjecting to extreme cold, sexual humiliation, and
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allowing little sleep for many days); see also Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F. Supp.2d 26, 27
(D.D.C. 2006) (allegations of “various forms of torture, which include hooding, forced
nakedness, . . . . subjection to extremes of heat and cold, . . . . and the use of unmuzzled
dogs for intimidation”); Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 493 (D. Fla.
1980) (“method of torture” included use of dogs eating cadavers at night whereby “the
sinister barking of the dogs would take sleep away from all prisoners”); Chitayev and
Chitayev v. Russia, [2007] ECHR 59334/00, para. 159 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 18, 2007) (“the illtreatment at issue [where “dogs were set on them”] . . . . amounted to torture”).
71
See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. at 16 n.3 (quoted supra note 69); Tourchin v.
Attorney General of the U.S., 277 Fed. Appx. 248, 252, 2008 WL 1962273 (3d Cir. 2008)
(claim of likelihood of torture addressed in the CAT was supported by past torture of an
alien and death threats against alien’s loved ones made by the KGB, also quoting 8 C.F.R. §
208.18(a)(4)(iii)-(iv), which notes that torture includes “[t]he threat of imminent death; or
[t]he threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain
or suffering”); Comollan v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 2004) (threat of imminent
death is a form of torture); Massie v. Government of Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea, _ F. Supp.2d _ , 2008 WL 5423028 (D.D.C. 2008) (pulling the trigger of a gun to the
head was “[a]nother form of torture”); Cannon v. Burge, 2006 WL 273544 (N.D. Ill. 2006)
(“forms of torture” included “mock executions by placing a gun in his mouth and pulling
the trigger”); In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 910 F. Supp. at 1463 (Russian
roulette during interrogation is torture); State v. Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593, 601 (Tenn. 1999)
(regarding “threats to kill,” “the anticipation of physical harm to one’s self or a loved one
constitutes mental torture”); PAUST, supra note 1, at 13, 16, 154 n.105, 158 n.122; U.S. Dep’t
of State, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, supra note 69, Iraq (“torture”
included “threats to rape or otherwise harm family members and relatives”); id. 2004
Report, Turkey (methods of torture included “stripping and blindfolding, threats to
detainees or family members”); infra notes 72, 83. 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2)(C)–(D) notes that
these types of threat are torture if they cause prolonged mental harm, but international law
does not require that the harm be prolonged. See infra note 107. If family members were
detained, however short, in connection with such threats, the conduct would also implicate
the separate crime of hostage-taking, which is a grave breach of the Geneva Civilian
Convention. GC, supra note 27, arts. 3(1)(b), 34, 147. It is also a crime outside the context of
an armed conflict under customary and treaty-based law and there is a treaty obligation to
initiate prosecution or extradite “without exception whatsoever.”
International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, arts. 1, 8, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; see
also 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (2000); S.C. Res. 579, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/579 (Dec. 18, 1985),
(“Condemns unequivocally all acts of hostage-taking and abduction”); U.S. Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran Case (United States v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24); United States v.
Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988).
72
See, e.g., In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. at 1463
(“forms of torture” include “[f]orcing a detainee while wet and naked to sit before an air
conditioner often while sitting on a block of ice”); PAUST, supra note 1, at 28, 178 n.15, 255
nn.86–87; Nowak, supra note 69, at 838; Ross & Esposito, supra note 69; Woodward, supra
note 70; infra note 83. See also Choezom v. Mukasey, 2008 WL 4898685 (2d Cir. 2008) (U.S.
State Department report noted Chinese “torture” of Tibetans by “exposure to cold”);
Lhanzom v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 833, 848 (7th Cir. 2005) (same); Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F.
Supp.2d at 27 (quoted supra note 70); Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 271 F. Supp.2d 179, 218
(D.D.C. 2003) (Saddam Hussein’s “agents of torture” used “excruciating physical and
mental torture” on U.S. pows, including “mock executions, threats of death, intense fear,
. . . . severe sleep deprivation, . . . . intense cold”); United States ex rel. De Creti v. Wilson,
967 F. Supp. 303, 305 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (putting a baby into a freezer is torture and can
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to these and other unlawful interrogation tactics authorized by the Bush
Administration, the Committee Against Torture declared in 2006 that the
United States
should rescind any interrogation technique, including
methods involving sexual humiliation, ‘water boarding,’
‘short shackling’ [e.g., shackling a detainee to a hook in
the floor], and using dogs to induce fear, that constitute
torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, in all places of detention under its de facto
effective control, in order to comply with its obligations
under the Convention.73

support murder conviction even though death by “hypothermia or suffocation” would take
time); State v. Piper, 709 N.W.2d at 799 (quoted supra note 69); In re Termination of Parental
Rights to Samuel J.R., 249 Wis.2d 491, 639 N.W.2d 225 (2001) (“torture inflicted” by
“placing a child in a dog cage in a cold, unheated basement and throwing a child out of the
house without any shoes or clothes on a cold night”); Gutierrez v. State, 112 Nev. 788, 792,
920 P.2d 987, 990 (1996) (“clearly sadistic acts of torture: subjecting her to freezing cold”
showers); Commonwealth v. Rochon, 398 Pa. Super. 494, 581 A.2d 239 (Pa. Super. 1990)
(“repeatedly immersed the little boy in water . . . did not stop this torture until her victim
became cyanotic and turned purple from cold”); Lopez v. State, 105 Nev. 68, 71, 769 P.2d
1276, 1279 (Nev. 1989) (torture included leaving a child in a “bathtub filled with cold water
for two hours”); State v. Walls, 744 S.W.2d 791, 800 (Mo. 1988) (torture occurred where
victim was beaten and locked “in a freezer to slowly suffer death by either suffocation or
hypothermia”); Anderson v. State, 466 N.E.2d 27, 33 (Ind. 1984) (“evidence of torture”
involved “body wounds and testimony of repeatedly dousing the boy in cold water”); State
v. Smith, 305 N.C. 691, 711, 292 S.E.2d 264, 276–77 (N.C. 1982) (“victim suffered agonizing
and humiliating torture” by being raped and “cruelly mocked . . . as she stood naked in the
cold”); Elci and Others v. Turkey, [2003] ECHR 23145/93, para. 646 (Nov. 13, 2003) (being
“stripped naked and hosed down with freezing cold water” and being “threatened with
death” “must . . . be regarded as constituting torture”); Edith Rose Gardner, Coerced
Confessions of Prisoners of War, 24 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 528, 534–35 (1955–56) (North Korean’s
used “severe” methods, including cases where prisoners “were kept standing . . . in . . .
winter cold for hours” and where some “were forced to stand on the frozen Yala River,
barefooted, their feet drenched with water which instantly froze fast to the ice, and to
remain there to ‘reflect.’”); Gabor Rona, Legal Issues in the “War on Terrorism – Reflecting on
the Conversation Between Silja N.U. Voneky and John Bellinger, 9 GERMAN L.J. 711, 719 nn.30,
32 (2008); U.S. Dep’t of State, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, supra note
69, Egypt (“torture methods” included being “stripped, . . . doused with . . . cold water,
. . . forced to stand outdoors in cold weather” [this last method, being forced to stand
outdoors in the cold, is not in the 2002 or 2003 report); id., Turkey (methods of torture
include “stripping and blindfolding[] and exposure to extreme cold or high-pressure cold
water hoses”); Woodward, supra note 70; infra note 83. A variation of the “cold cell”
involves stripping a person naked, placing the person in a cold room, and dousing the
person with water in order to produce hypothermia that can turn the body blue and
produce violent shaking and even death.
73
CAT Report, supra note 22, ¶ 24. See also International Committee of the Red Cross,
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Although the intentional use of sexual violence and rape as tactics
are recognizably torture,74 some forms of sexual humiliation that were
authorized and used might not have constituted severe pain or suffering.
Nonetheless, they can be manifestly inhumane or degrading and,
therefore, equally unlawful. Previously, the Committee condemned the
following tactics as either torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment proscribed by the Convention: (1) restraining in very painful
conditions, (2) hooding under special conditions, (3) sounding of loud
music for prolonged periods, (4) sleep deprivation for prolonged
periods, (5) threats, including death threats, (6) violent shaking, and (7)
using cold air to chill.75
ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen “High Value Detainees” in CIA Custody 8–9, 26 (Feb.
2007), available at http://pegc.us/archive/Organizations/ICRC_rpt_hvd_20070214.pdf
(alleged unlawful tactics included: suffocation by water, prolonged stress standing
position, beatings by use of a collar, beating and kicking, confinement in a box, prolonged
nudity, sleep deprivation, exposure to cold temperature, prolonged shackling, threats of illtreatment, forced shaving, deprivation/restricted provision of solid food.
This regime was clearly designed to undermine human dignity and to
create a sense of futility by inducing, in many cases, severe physical
and mental pain and suffering . . . resulting in exhaustion,
depersonalization and dehumanization. The allegations of illtreatment of the detainees indicate that, in many cases, the illtreatment . . . either singly or in combination, constituted torture. In
addition, many . . . constituted cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
In Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1347–49 (N.D. Ga. 2002), the court
recognized that “[c]ruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment is a discrete and wellrecognized violation of customary international law and is, therefore, a separate ground for
liability,” adding, “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment includes acts which inflict
mental or physical suffering, anguish, humiliation, fear and debasement, which do not rise
to the level of ‘torture’ and that being “forced to observe the suffering of their friends and
neighbors . . . [is] another form of inhumane and degrading treatment[.]” See also Rome
Statute of the ICC, supra note 21, arts. 8(b)(xxi), (c)(ii) (“humiliating and degrading
treatment” are “outrages upon personal dignity” and are war crimes).
74
See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 852, 854 (1994) (Blackmun, J., concurring);
Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 2002); Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463,
472 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[r]ape can constitute torture”); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242 (2d
Cir. 1995); In re Extradition of Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 676, 682 (N.D. Cal. 1988);
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovic, IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1A, Judgement ¶ 137, 150–
51, 153 (June 12, 2002); Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-13-T, Transcript ¶ 222 (Jan. 27,
2000); Torture Victims Relief Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2152 note (torture includes “rape and other
forms of sexual violence”); HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 21, at 318 & n.99;
Diane Marie Amann, International Decisions: Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 195,
196–97 (1999); Evelyn Mary Aswad, Torture by Means of Rape, 84 GEO. L.J. 1913, 1915–16
(1996); Beth Stephens, Humanitarian Law and Gender Violence: An End to Centuries of
Neglect?, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 87, 95–96 (1999); see also Prosecutor v. Delalic, ICTY96-21-7, Judgement ¶ 475–97 (Nov. 16, 1998); PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 26, at 693,
748.
75
Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: Israel, 18th Sess., ¶ 256–
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Many of these illegal tactics, including water-boarding and the “cold
cell,” were addressed and expressly and/or tacitly approved during
several meetings of the National Security Council’s Principals
Committee in the White House during 2002 and 2003 that were attended
by Dick Cheney, his lawyer David Addington, Condoleezza Rice,
Donald Rumsfeld, George Tenet, John Ashcroft, and others who
facilitated their approval and use, including John Yoo.76 With a typical
57 U.N. Doc. A/52/44 (Sept. 5, 1997). Concerning torture by sleep deprivation, see also
Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 271 F. Supp.2d at 218 (quoted supra note 72); Shepherd v. Ault,
982 F. Supp. 643, 648 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“[T]he effectiveness of sleep deprivation as a tool of
torture has long been recognized.” (citing Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 151 (1944)); Rounds v. State, 106 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Tenn. 1937) (“To
deprive a human of sleep for four days and nights is a form of torture not less severe than
physical violence.”) (citing Ziang Sun Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924)).
76
Jan Crawford Greenburg, Howard L. Rosenberg & Ariane de Vogue, Bush Aware of
Advisers’ Interrogation Talks, ABC News, Apr. 11, 2008 http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=
4635175 (last visited Feb. 9, 2009) (adding, “the most senior Bush administration officials
repeatedly discussed and approved specific details,” and “meetings . . . were typically
attended by most of the principals or their deputies,” and “[s]ources said that at each
discussion, all the Principals present approved”). The meetings were often held in the
White House situation room. Id. See also Lara Jakes Jordan, Cheney Led Approvals of Harsh
Interrogations, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ), Apr. 11, 2008 at 1; Mark Mazzetti, Top U.S.
Officials Debated CIA Methods, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 25, 2008, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/09/25/america/cia.php (last visited Feb. 9, 2009)
(adding that John Bellinger has stated that John Yoo issued oral guidance concerning
interrogation tactics to the CIA during such meetings); Greg Miller, Cheney Says He Had Key
Role in Interrogation Methods, BALT. SUN, Dec. 16, 2008, at 14A; Joby Warrick, Top Officials
Knew in 2002 of Harsh Interrogations, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2008, at A7; Jan Crawford
Greenburg, Howard L. Rosenberg & Ariane de Vogue, Sources: Top Bush Advisors Approved
‘Enhanced Interrogation’—Detailed Discussions Were Held About Techniques to Use on al Qaeda
Suspects, ABC News, Apr. 9, 2008 available at http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/
LawPolitics/story?id=4583256&page=1 (those who participated “approved,” a “handful of
top advisers signed off on,” discussions of techniques “were so detailed” that some “were
almost choreographed,” and Tenet “regularly sought confirmation”); Lara Jakes Jordan &
Pamela Hess, Cheney, Others OK’d Harsh Interrogations, Apr. 11, 2008, http://abcnews.go.
com/politics/wirestory?id=4631535; Matthew Lee, Rice Defends Post 9/11 Interrogation
Techniques, AP NEWS, May 22, 2008, http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5jYsZfE9RBbjOv-ed37E9_23gLdQD90R5MD00; Ashcroft Involved With Torture Memos, Bush
Administration Lawyers, June 27, 2008, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/
2008/06/ashcroft-involved-with-torture-memos.php (last visited Feb. 9, 2009); White House
Memos to CIA Approved Waterboarding : Washington Post, Oct. 15, 2008, available at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2008/10/white-house-memos-to-cia-approved.php
(last visited Feb. 9, 2009); Report, Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry Into the
Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, (Dec. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Senate ASC Report],
http://armed-services.senate.gov/Publications/EXEC%20SUMMARY-CONCLUSIONS_
For%20Release_12%20December%202008.pdf; PAUST, supra note 1, at 28, 30, 150–51 n.89
(regarding White House meetings chaired by Alberto Gonzales, with William Haynes and
David Addington in attendance, discussing and approving or finding “acceptable” specific
interrogation tactics such as water-boarding), 152 n.96 (regarding Porter Goss on water-
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boarding), 161 n.138 (“simulated drowning and the withholding of pain medication[] were
authorized for the CIA at White House meetings” chaired by Gonzales), 175 nn.11–12
(regarding roles of Cheney and Addington), 179 n.18 (regarding the role of Gonzales), 179
n.19 (Presidential Finding in 2002 signed by President Bush, National Security Adviser
Rice, and Attorney General Ashcroft approved water-boarding and other unlawful
coercive interrogation tactics), 181 n.28 (regarding the role of Gonzales); JOHN YOO, WAR BY
OTHER MEANS 30–31 (Atlantic Monthly Press 2006). Starting in December 2001,
Senior lawyers from the attorney general’s office, the White House
counsel’s office, the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSC
met . . . . This group of lawyers would meet repeatedly over the next
months to develop policy of the war on terrorism. We certainly did
not all agree . . . . Meetings were usually chaired by Alberto
Gonzales . . . . At meetings, his deputy, Timothy Flanigan, usually
played the role of inquisitor . . . .
Id. [O]ften at the meetings were William Howard Taft IV, John Bellinger, Jim Haynes,
David Addington and “Bellinger often shared Taft’s accommodating attitude toward
international law[.]” Id. at 32-33. In mid-January 2002, “the lawyers met again in the White
House situation room . . . . Consensus eluded the group,” but Gonzales would later
summarize the positions for the President. Id. at 39. Scott Shane, David Johnston & James
Risen, Secret U.S. Endorsement of Severe Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, at 1 (Attorney
General Gonzales approved a memo written by Steven G. Bradbury attempting to justify
coercive CIA tactics, including “simulated drowning and frigid temperatures” and their
use for “combined effects;” Deputy Attorney General James B. Comey warned Gonzales
that he should not approve, but Gonzales “made clear that the White House was adamant
about it, and that he would do nothing to resist;” and some officials warned “that no
reasonable interpretation of ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading’ would permit” certain CIA
methods, including water-boarding); Barton Gellman & Jo Becker, Angler: The Cheney Vice
Presidency, June 24, 2007, at 1 http://blog.washingtonpost.com/cheney/chapters/
chapter_1/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2009); (general roles of Cheney, Addington, Flanigan, and
Gonzales in denying Geneva law protections to detainees), infra notes 77–80, 86, 89–96, 99–
102. ABC News, supra. Then Attorney General Ashcroft provided a trenchant warning at
one of the meetings: “Why are we talking about this in the White House? History will not
judge this kindly.” Indeed, how could one whose heart had not grown cold even sit
through explanations of water-boarding, the cold cell, and use of dogs to terrorize naked
detainees without realizing that such methods are, at a minimum, inhumane and an assault
on human dignity?
Responses of Condoleezza Rice, Sept. 12, 2008, in Opening Statement by Senator Carl
Levin, Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on the Authorization of SERE
Techniques for Interrogations in Iraq: Part II of the Committee’s Inquiry into the Treatment
of Detainees in U.S. Custody (Sept. 25, 2008), TAB 3, at 3–5, 7, http://levin.senate.gov/
newsroom/supporting/2008/SASC.documents.092508.pdf.
In written responses on
September 12, 2008 to questions from Senator Carl Levin, Secretary Rice stated that “CIA’s
proposed program was . . . reviewed by the NSC Principals,” she “was present in meetings
at which DOJ lawyers provided legal advice about the CIA program” and “that John Yoo
provided advice at several of these meetings,” she “asked the Attorney General personally
to review the legal guidance prepared by OLC [DOJ],” she understands that DOJ “was
providing advice to CIA, and that this advice was being coordinated by Counsel to the
President Alberto Gonzales,” and her legal adviser John Bellinger “advised me on a regular
basis regarding concerns and issues relating to DOD detention policies and practices at
Guantanamo.” Id. Senator Levin’s statement is available at http://levin.senate.gov/
newsroom/release.cfm?id=303575. Written responses of John Bellinger to Senator Levin
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smug defiance, Cheney admitted that “he was directly involved in
approving severe interrogation methods . . . including . . . ‘waterboarding’” and that he was “involved in helping get the process
cleared.”77 With respect to the configurative contributions of his team,
President Bush was quoted as stating “yes, I’m aware our national
security team met on this issue. And I approved.”78

stated that “[a] number of individuals who were present at meetings I attended on the CIA
program, or the legal guidance thereon, asked questions or expressed concerns about these
issues,” and “I was present at several meetings at which OLC attorneys provided oral
advice regarding interrogation techniques proposed to be used by CIA,” and “I recall
that . . . John Yoo provided legal guidance in some of the meetings,” thus “I raised . . .
concerns [upon hearing about tactics used at GTMO] on several occasions with DOD
officials and was told that the allegations were being investigated by the Naval Criminal
Investigative Service.” Id. TAB 4, at 3–5, 8. Merely raising concerns and asking for further
inquiry might not be enough to avoid responsibility if one continued to attend such
meetings; knew that tactics such as water-boarding, the cold cell, or the use of dogs against
naked detainees to instill intense fear continued; and did not resign. See, e.g., Trial of Koiso,
supra note 43; see also supra note 40. Again, it is difficult to believe that anyone who
attended such meetings would not realize that such tactics are, at a minimum, inhumane.
77
See Miller, supra note 76, adding that when “[a]sked whether he still believes it was
appropriate to use the waterboarding method . . . , Cheney said: ‘I do.’” Concerning the
role of Cheney, see also PAUST, supra note 1, at 12, 27–28, 30, 150 n.89, 153–54 n.97, 175–7
nn.9–10, 13–14; Demetri Sevastopulo, Cheney Endorses Simulated Drowning, MSNBC, Oct. 26,
2006, http://www.msn.com/id/15433467; Scott Hennen interview with Vice President
Richard Cheney, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 24, 2006) http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2006/10/20061024-7.html (water-boarding has “been a very important tool that
we’ve had to be able to” use); supra note 76.
78
ABC News Apr. 11, 2008, supra note 76. See also Shane, Johnston & Risen, supra note
76 (in July 2006, President Bush signed a new executive order to further his program of
“enhanced” interrogation and secret detention); Randall Mikkelsen, CIA Detention Program
Remains Active: U.S. Official, REUTERS NEWS, Oct. 4, 2007; Dan Eggen, White House Defends
CIA’s Use of Waterboarding in Interrogations, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2008, at A3 (White House
spokesman Tony Fratto said water-boarding is legal and can be authorized and that “every
enhanced technique that has been used by the CIA for this program was brought to the
Department of Justice, and they made a determination”; “CIA Director Michael V. Hayden
confirmed . . . that the agency had used waterboarding[.]”); Interview of President George
W. Bush by Brit Hume, Fox News Sunday (Jan. 7, 2009) http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=gnpZgMlw9-o (last visited Feb 9, 2009) (Bush admits that he approved the use of
such “techniques” or “tools” and had authorized their use on at least “one such person
who gave us information,” Khalid Sheik Muhammad); President George W. Bush, radio
address, Mar. 8, 2008 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/03/20080308.
html (concerning his veto of an Intelligence Authorization Act of 2008 that would have
required CIA personnel to follow a military manual that prohibits water-boarding, sensory
deprivation, hypothermia, and denial of food, water or medical care, Bush stated that the
legislation “would take away one of the most valuable tools in the war on terror—the CIA
program to detain and question”—and take away “specialized interrogation procedures to
question” and “would eliminate all the alternative procedures we’ve developed to
question” detainees).
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During President Bush’s admitted “program” of “tough”
interrogation and secret detention or forced disappearance,79 and as part
of the well-documented “common, unifying” plan to deny Geneva law
protections and to use and attempt to justify serial and cascading
criminality in the form of “coercive interrogation,”80 the Administration
used shifting definitions of “torture” as if the manifest illegality of its
approved interrogation tactics could be defined away. The definitions
did not reflect well-known definitions and criteria used in customary
and treaty-based international law,81 or, at times, those used by the U.S.
Executive in its Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for a number of years and by judges in many U.S. federal and
state court cases addressing the types of treatment authorized by
President Bush and his entourage,82 including several cases addressing
79
See, e.g., PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 29, 179–80 n.22; supra notes 21-22.
Concerning Bush admissions, authorizations, directives, and findings, see, e.g., id. at x, 7–8,
17, 26, 28–30, 32, 35, 145–47, 176, 179–80; Majority Staff Report, H.R. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, REINING IN THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY: LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
RELATING TO THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH, at 136 Jan. 13, 2009 [hereinafter House
Comm. Report] (“[I]n Secretary Powell’s view, Mr. Bush was ‘complicit’ in these abuses.”)
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th/IPres090113.pdf; supra
note 78; infra notes 101–02.
80
See, e.g., House Comm. Report, supra note 79, at 110–46; PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW,
supra note 1, at 27–30, 32; JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR
ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS 150 (Doubleday 2008) (noting an
early 2002 meeting of Yoo, Gonzales, Addington, Flanigan, and Haynes discussing “what
sorts of pain” to inflict), 185 (noting conflicts between Addington and Bellinger), 198–99
(noting that Addington, Gonzales, Haynes, Goldsmith, and others had flown to
Guantanamo in September 2002 to discuss and observe use of SERE [Survival Evasion
Resistance and Escape] tactics on detainees who were still held in secret detention or forced
disappearance), 304, 307, 311–12 (noting the facilitating role of Gonzales) (Doubleday 2008);
YOO, supra note 76, at ix, 30, 35, 39–40, 43, 171–72, 177–78, 190–92, 200, 202; UN Torture
Investigator Calls on Obama to Charge Bush for Guantanamo Abuses, JURIST, Jan. 21, 2009,
available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2009/01/un-torture-investigator-callson-obama.php; supra notes 76–78; infra notes 84–102 and accompanying text. John Yoo
wrote that he had also flown with other lawyers to Guantanamo in early January 2002. See
YOO, supra note 76, at 18, 38–39, 44. Those lawyers knew that persons transferred to
Guantanamo were held in secret detention because their names were not released. Such
constitutes a form of forced disappearance, a crime against humanity that during an armed
conflict is also a war crime. See supra note 21.
81
See, e.g., PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 11, 150–51 nn.89–90 (discussing the
Administration’s attempt to limit or redefine “torture” in order to permit aggressive and
painful interrogation techniques); supra notes 62 (providing typical definitions of torture),
69 (discussing various techniques that have historically been categorized as “torture”), 72–
74 (providing more standards and specific examples of “torture”); infra notes 85 (analyzing
the Bybee torture memo’s ability to provide a defense to alleged acts of “torture”), 107
(recognizing the pitfalls of the justice system’s ability to prosecute acts of “torture” and the
need to ensure that all acts of “torture” are criminal offenses).
82
See supra notes 69 (describing specific techniques that have traditionally been called
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the prohibition of “cruel” treatment and torture under the Eighth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.83 These cases and Country Reports
on Human Rights could have been easily discovered through use of
computer-assisted research, thus demonstrating that several writers of
memoranda did not attempt to provide independent, careful, and
professional legal advice.
In particular, one memorandum (often-called the “Bybee torture
memo”),84 completed in August 2002 by John Yoo and Jay Bybee, set
forth what had become the Administration’s preferred but patently
improper standard regarding “torture.” According to the Bybee memo,

“torture”), 72.
83
More generally, the Supreme Court has recognized the impermissibility of “coercive
cruelty.” Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). U.S. cases have also provided
information recognizing what types of conduct can amount to cruel treatment under the
Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 14, 17 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (finding that “shocking them with electric currents, asphyxiating them short of
death,
intentionally
exposing
them
to
undue
heat
or
cold,”
and
inflicti[ng] . . . “psychological pain” is cruel treatment); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304
(1991) (involving a combination of deprivation of food and warmth, “for example, a low
cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets.” Relevant mens rea can
involve “wanton” conduct or “deliberate indifference[.]”); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
104 (1976) (“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain[]’”); Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413, 414-15
(1967) (deprivation of adequate food and detention naked in a small cell was in context “a
shocking display of barbarism”); Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 36, 38 (1967) (“gross
coercion[]” existed when an officer pressed a gun to the face and stated “‘[i]f you don’t tell
the truth I am going to kill you[]’” and thereafter another officer fired a rifle nearby);
Robinson, 370 U.S. at 669 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“water cures” are “terror”); United
States v. Rojas Tapia, 466 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2006) (“physically coercive punishment, such as
an unreasonable deprivation of food or sleep[]” obviates voluntariness of a confession);
Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 642 (7th Cir. 1997) (subjection to cold); Littlewind v. Rayl,
33 F.3d 985, 986 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that the plaintiff had been restrained naked for
seven hours, denied clothing for six days, denied a blanket for two days, restrained seven
days in leg irons and handcuffs, and tied to a bed for eight hours); Northington v. Jackson,
973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992) (describing an incident where an officer threatened to
kill a suspect by pointing a gun to his head); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 526 (2d Cir.
1967) (finding that solitary confinement conditions in a “strip cell” (where a prisoner is
nude and exposed to bitter cold) is cruel and “serve[s] to destroy completely the spirit and
undermine the sanity of the prisoner[]”) (internal citations omitted); Scarver v. Litscher, 371
F. Supp. 2d 986, 993 (W.D. Wis. 2005) (stripping a person naked and placing him in a cold
cell without a mattress, blankets, etc.); Ferola v. Moran, 622 F. Supp. 814, 821 (D.R.I. 1985)
(restraint so as to deny access to a bathroom for fourteen hours); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F.
Supp. 786, 789 (M.D. Tenn. 1969) (forcing persons to strip nude and sleep on cement floors
with no means to maintain personal cleanliness); Al Ghashiyah v. McCaughtry, 602
N.W.2d 307, 311, 316 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that strip searches employed for the
purpose of intimidating a person or humiliating or harassing are not legal.). See also
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 26 (quoted supra note 69).
84
See PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 11, 150 n.89.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 4 [2009], Art. 1

1564

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

“torture” should involve far more than the widely known treaty-based
and customary international legal test of “severe” physical or mental
pain or suffering, and the test set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1). According
to the Bybee memo, the definition of “severe” must be the “equivalent
[of] the pain that would be associated with serious physical injury so
sever [sic] that death, organ failure, or permanent damage resulting in a
loss of a significant body function will likely result[.]”85 Because the
Id. at 151 n.90. Some news media have referred to the Bybee torture memo as the
“Golden Shield[,]” as if it can shield those who planned, authorized, ordered, abetted, or
perpetrated torture, cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment from criminal prosecution.
See, e.g., Greenburg, et al., supra note 76. However, the shield is made of fool’s gold and is
full of holes. For example, orders or authorizations to engage in interrogation tactics that
will manifestly produce what the community will judge to be torture, cruel, inhumane, or
degrading treatment are orders or authorizations to engage in conduct that is manifestly
illegal whether or not the criminal accused knows that the conduct is illegal or knows that
the conduct is torture, cruel, inhumane, or degrading. Manifestly unlawful orders or
authorizations are not a defense. See, e.g., PAUST, et al., supra note 26, at 100–14; Rome
Statute of the ICC, supra note 21, at 19, art. 33(1) (stating that an order does not relieve the
recipient of responsibility unless “(b) [t]he person did not know that the order was
unlawful; and (c) [t]he order was not manifestly unlawful[]”); see also id. at 19, art. 33(2)
(“orders to commit . . . crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful[]” per se). Thus,
as a matter of law, an order to engage in forced disappearance or secret detention as an
admitted part of the Bush program is not a defense. See also FM 27-10, supra note 28, at 182,
¶ 509(a) (an order does not constitute a defense for the recipient “unless he did not know
and could not reasonably have been expected to know that the act ordered was unlawful”);
CAT, supra note 20, at 114, art. 2(3) (“An order . . . may not be invoked as a justification of
torture.”); PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 37–38, 111–12, 155–56 n.113, 170 n.193,
179 n.21, 261 n.115, 286–87 n.90; United States v. Von Leeb and Others (The High
Command Case (1948)), 15 INT’L L. REPS. 376 (1949) (Hitler’s directives “had the force and
effect of law[,]” but to recognize as a defense to international crimes that a defendant acted
pursuant to the order of his government or of a superior “would be to recognize an
absurdity[;]” international law “must . . . take precedence over National Law or directives
issued by any national governmental authority[;]” and “[a] directive to violate
International Criminal . . . Law is therefore void and can afford no protection to one who
violates such law in reliance on such a directive . . . .”). The ploy “I did not know that
water-boarding was unlawful or torture” will not work, since water-boarding is manifestly
unlawful and torture (see supra note 69); and if it is not torture, it is cruel, and if it is not
cruel, it is inhumane and, therefore, it is necessarily unlawful under common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions, Articles 1 and 16 of the CAT, Article 7 of the ICCPR, customary
international law reflected in the above, and so forth. Although this writing focuses mainly
on torture, a primary prohibition is the outlawry of inhumane treatment. See also supra
notes 2, 73 (discussing the fact that inhumane treatment in any circumstance is unlawful
regardless of whether it rises to the level of “torture”). Furthermore, the Bybee memo was
written after specific tactics had been used and, therefore, was inoperative as any putative
“shield” regarding prior conduct because it could not have been honestly relied on. Quite
clearly, the mere fact that a particular tactic was approved in an Executive memo is not a
defense, and if Attorney General Holder is going to uphold his duty to prosecute crime, he
cannot consider that a memo provides immunity.
Additionally, several high level officials were warned or on notice of legal
85

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss4/1

Paust: The Absolute Prohibition of Torture and Necessary and Appropriate

2009]

The Absolute Prohibition of Torture

1565

memo was written after several of the White House meetings during
which an inner circle (and John Yoo) had discussed and approved or
facilitated use of specific interrogation tactics,86 and was created
improprieties regarding denial of Geneva protections, secret detention, and use of coercive
tactics. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 5–8, 14–17, 19, 50–51, 162–63 n.143, 172–73 n.1, 176
nn.11–12, 188 n.45; Senate ASC Report, supra note 76, at xviii–xxi; Jane Mayer, The Memo:
How an Internal Effort to Ban the Abuse and Torture of Detainees Was Thwarted, THE NEW
YORKER, (Feb. 27, 2006), available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/02/27/
060227fa_fact (regarding warnings by Alberto Mora and others); Shane et al., supra note 76
(reporting on the Justice Department’s secret endorsement of the harshest interrogation
techniques ever used by the CIA); supra notes 22, 73 (discussing U.N. Committee Against
Torture reports condemning cruel treatment that does not rise to the level of torture).
Some of the International Committee of the Red Cross warnings of widespread and
intentional unlawful treatment had even become public, which usually occurs after
warnings to government officials and quiet diplomacy have failed. See, e.g., PAUST, supra
note 1, at 17, 19, 162 n.143, 163 n.145, 268 n.15 (discussing various Red Cross warnings).
Criminal conduct was also widely reported for several years by various media and nongovernmental organizations, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Human
Rights First, the American Bar Association, the ACLU, and the Center for Constitutional
Rights. At least by 2004, public constructive notice was rampant. For many years before
and during the Bush Administration, the Executive’s own Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices had also listed several relevant tactics as torture. See supra notes 69, 71–72.
By 2005, public condemnation also occurred by the Council of Europe Parliamentary
Assembly. See supra note 21 (discussing the various groups that condemned the Bush
Administration’s actions). In 2006, in the face of known illegalities of the Bush
Administration, a rare resolution of the American Society of International Law was created
because of the tireless professional efforts of Professor Ben Davis, reaffirming what every
professional international lawyer had known, that “[t]orture and cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment of any person . . . are prohibited by international law from which no
derogation is permitted[,]” among other points. See Resolution Adopted, THE AMERICAN
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Mar. 30, 2006, available at http://www.asil.org/events/
amo6/resolutions.html. The U.S. Congress had made this point earlier in October 2004.
See PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 177 n.13 (describing that a year earlier the full
Congress declared that torture or cruel treatment of prisoners held in the custody of the
United States was prohibited).
86
See supra note 76; see also Senate ASC Report, supra note 76, at xv–xvi (Bellinger “said
that he was present in meetings [of the NSC’s Principals Committee] ‘at which SERE
training was discussed.’” Two Bybee memos were written “after consultation with senior
Administration attorneys, including” Gonzales and Addington [one memo is public and
known as the Bybee torture memo. Another memo had addressed specific interrogation
tactics and has not been declassified]; “[b]efore drafting the opinions, Mr. Yoo, . . . met with
Alberto Gonzales” and Addington “to discuss the subjects he intended to address in the
opinions[]”; Bybee “saw an assessment of the psychological effects of military resistance
training [the SERE program] in July 2002 in meetings in his office with John Yoo . . . [and]
Bybee said that he used that assessment to inform the August 1, 2002 OLC legal opinion”
on tactics. “Bybee also recalled discussing detainee interrogations in a meeting with
Attorney General John Ashcroft and John Yoo in late July 2002, prior to” creation of the
opinions). John Yoo has admitted that an inner circle devised a “common, unifying” plan
to deny Geneva law protections and to authorize and facilitate use of “coercive
interrogation” (which violates international law whether or not particular tactics are
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expressly to deal with “the conduct of interrogations outside of the
United States and possible defenses that [allegedly] would negate any
claim that certain interrogation methods [already approved] violate” a
particular federal statute,87 it is obvious that the memo was not written
for independent professional legal advice, but to provide possible cover
for tactics already approved and to facilitate their use in the future.
Moreover, because the memo writers had refused to use the widely
known test with respect to torture, the Bybee memo was facially devoid
of legal propriety and blatantly facilitated the use of criminal
interrogation tactics. The memo had also made the patently erroneous
claim that, as a matter of law, “necessity and self-defense could justify
interrogation methods needed to elicit information.”88
Criticism of the manifestly erroneous memo grew so widespread in
the U.S. and abroad that the memo was eventually withdrawn and
replaced by a 2004 memo that is still classified; however, criticism
continued to demonstrate that the Bush Administration’s definition of
torture remained unacceptable and that unlawful tactics being used for
interrogation had not been withdrawn. There was actually a second
August 2002 Bybee memo prepared by John Yoo that addressed specific
interrogation tactics.89 It was not withdrawn until June 200490 when the
new head of OLC, Jack Goldsmith, finally decided to withdraw the
opinion nearly eight months after he had learned of the secret CIA tactics
for interrogation authorized in the second Bybee memo.91 For nearly
eight months, Goldsmith apparently decided that he would not oppose
the use of any particular tactic addressed in the memo or otherwise
known to be used by the CIA.92
torture). See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 30, 181–82 nn.28–35. As Steven Kleinman noted
during the 2009 Valparaiso University Law Review Symposium, those who recommended
and authorized the use of SERE tactics apparently did not understand that they are
unavoidably counterproductive and harm efforts to produce needed reliable intelligence.
87
See PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 150 n.89.
88
Id. at 11. But see supra notes 1, 9, 11, 14, 67 and accompanying text (stating that torture
and unlawful treatment is definitively condemned even in the face of armed conflict and
the needs of national defense).
89
See supra note 86 (describing two Bybee memos); JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR
PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 150–51, 155 (W. W.
Norton & Co. 2007) (“in a second August 1, 2002, opinion that still remains classified, OLC
applied . . . abstract analysis to approve particular and still-classified interrogation
techniques . . . that underlay the CIA interrogation program[]” and “attendant CIA
techniques[]”).
90
GOLDSMITH, supra note 89, at 159.
91
See id. at 150–55, 159.
92
See id. Despite the fact that the second August 2002 opinion remains classified, we
know that some of the illegal tactics authorized for use included water-boarding, use of
dogs to create intense fear, threatening to kill detainees, the use of the cold cell, stripping
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A March 14, 2003 memo written by John Yoo for William Haynes93
(after participation in several of the White House meetings of the
Principals Committee) had, in Goldsmith’s words, “contained abstract
and overbroad legal advice, but the actual techniques approved by the
[defense] department were specific[.]”94 In December 2003, Goldsmith
decided to withdraw the March 2003 Yoo memo, but he told Ashcroft
and Haynes that he allowed the Department of Defense “to continue to
employ the twenty-four techniques.”95
In March 2004, a draft memo penned and “circulated” by Jack
Goldsmith fit perfectly within the common, unifying plan to deny
Geneva protections and engage in secret detention and coercive
interrogation by claiming that persons in Iraq can be transferred “to
another country to facilitate interrogation[,]”96 despite the clear, absolute,
naked and hooding detainees, and sexual humiliation. See supra notes 69–73, 76–80
(discussing various tactics used to “interrogate” detainees). See also Senate ASC Report,
supra note 76, at xxviii (noting that Rumsfeld’s approval of Haynes’s recommendation in
2002 “influenced and contributed to the use of abusive techniques, including military
working dogs, forced nudity, and stress positions, in Afghanistan and Iraq[]”).
93
John C. Yoo, Memorandum for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of
Defense, (Mar. 14, 2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/yoo_army_
torture_memo.pdf.
94
GOLDSMITH, supra note 89, at 151.
95
Id. at 153, 154–55. Goldsmith was referring to Rumsfeld’s twenty-four techniques. Id.
at 153. Concerning these tactics, see PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 15, 158–59
n.122; see also supra note 92 (discussing several of the illegal tactics authorized for use in the
“interrogation” of detainees).
96
See PAUST, BEYOND THE Law, supra note 1, at 18, 163 n.148. See also GOLDSMITH, supra
note 89, at 99–100 (reporting that Goldsmith flew to GTMO with Addington, Philbin, Rizzo,
and others and that they were briefed and “witnessed an ongoing interrogation[]”), 119
(“[T]he United States could not, in my view, be bound by any customary laws of war to
confer legal protections on the terrorists detained at GTMO.”), 136 (stating that even after
the Supreme Court rightly recognized in Hamdan, in 2006, that Common Article 3 provides
a set of minimum rights “of humane treatment[,]” Goldsmith thought [without
explanation] that the “Article 3 holding was legally erroneous[]”), 153 (reporting that
Goldsmith, Philbin, and others decided that the twenty-four tactics that had been
authorized in the April 2003 Rumsfeld memo were lawful, including “Fear Up Harsh:
Significantly increasing the fear level in a detainee” [See Secretary Donald Rumsfeld,
Memorandum for the Commander, US Southern Command, Apr. 16, 2003, Tab A, #E,
reprinted in KAREN J. GREENBERG & JOSHUA L. DRATEL, THE TORTURE PAPERS 334, 335 (2005).
Other tactics reportedly authorized included unlawful tactics of stripping naked and
hooding for interrogation, use of dogs for interrogation, and short shacking, etc.]; MAYER,
THE DARK SIDE, supra note 80, at 198–99 (reporting that on Sept. 26, 2002, Goldsmith, who
was in the Office of DOD General Counsel Haynes, was among several lawyers (including
Addington, Gonzales, and Haynes) who flew to Guantanamo to discuss and observe actual
use of SERE tactics during interrogations of detainees held in secret detention or forced
disappearance). Thus, Goldsmith must have known by 2004 what transfer to “facilitate
interrogation” meant under the Bush program both in terms of likely tactics to be used by
U.S. and foreign interrogators (especially after having worked for Haynes in the DOD “as
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and criminal prohibition of the transfer of any non-prisoner of war out of
occupied territory under the Geneva Civilian Convention and customary
international law.97 To “facilitate interrogation,” the Goldsmith memo
also made the patently erroneous claim that a detainee who was not
lawfully in Iraq could be denied protections under Geneva law.98
his ‘Special Counsel[]’” since September of 2002 and admittedly “worrying about the
possibility of excessive interrogations” while at the DOJ in 2003)). GOLDSMITH, supra note
89, at 21, 141; cf id. at 29 (stating that he did not know about the CIA’s interrogation
program before starting at the DOJ in October 2003, but thereafter he did not oppose the
use of any tactic or secret detention), 41 (stating that the conclusion in his OLC opinion of
October 2003 was personally communicated to Gonzales and Addington, that all Iraqis of
any status in occupied Iraq have protections under the Geneva Civilian Convention), 59
(claiming that, under Haynes at the DOD, Goldsmith was viewed “[a]s a . . . critic of many
aspects of the international human rights movement, [and] was the perfect person for the
assignment[]” to oppose use of human rights law and law of war “judicialization”), 172
(claiming that although his 2004 draft opinion “had circulated in March 2004[,]” he never
finalized it and “it never became operational[]”). Concerning the September trip to GTMO,
see Senate ASC Report, supra note 76, at xvi.
97
GC, supra note 27, at arts. 49, 147; PAUST, BE YOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 18, 30,
163–64 nn.147–152. See also Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 21, at art. 8(2)(a)(vii);
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 85(4)(a), 1125
U.N.T.S. 3. The rights, duties, and prohibitions reflected in the 1949 Geneva Conventions
are “customary international law[.]” See, e.g., PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 8,
134 n.8. It is widely known that any violation of the laws of war is a war crime. Id. at 133
n.2. A memorandum by Bybee to Haynes in 2002 also addressed the transfer of members
of the Taliban, al Qaeda, and others “who have come under the control of the United States
armed forces, to other countries.” The memo argued that such transfers were permissible
under GPW and (in error) the CAT, but did not address the Geneva Civilian Convention’s
absolute prohibition of transfer of anyone who is not a prisoner of war. See Jay S. Bybee,
Memorandum for William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel, Department of Defense, Re: The
President’s power as Commander in Chief to transfer captured terrorists to the control and
custody of foreign nations (March 13, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/
documents/memorandumpresidentpower03132002.pdf. The memo erroneously claimed
that the CAT does not apply outside U.S. territory. Id. at 23–24. But see CAT Comm. Gen.
Comm., supra note 1, paras. 7 (“any person . . . subject to the de jure or de facto control of a
State”), 16 (“where a State party exercises, directly or indirectly, de facto or de jure control
over persons”), 19; PAUST, supra note 1, at 173, 187–88, 190, 199–200. Given control over
occupied territory, transfer therefrom can fit within words such as “expel, return . . . or
extradite” within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the CAT. See CAT, supra note 20, art. 3(1).
Because U.S. registered aircraft and vessels are the equivalent of U.S. territory under
international law, the same should pertain with respect to transfers from a U.S. aircraft or
vessel.
98
See PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 18, 163–64 nn.149-152. There are no gaps
in protection from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and denial of rights to
minimum due process because of the status of a detainee. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
548 U.S. 557, 629–31 & n.63 (2006). PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW,supra note 1, at 1–4, 8, 42, 70,
138 n.20, 183–88, 189–90 n.59, 215 n.27, 267 n.15, 294 n.171. In particular, rights, duties and
prohibitions reflected in common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions are customary
international law applicable in all armed conflicts. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631 n.63; PAUST,
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In 2005, a memo penned by Steven G. Bradbury of the Office of Legal
Counsel at the Department of Justice and approved by then Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales provided “an expansive endorsement of the
harshest interrogation techniques ever used by the Central Intelligence
Agency[,]” including water-boarding and use of “frigid temperatures.”99
In July, 2006, soon after the Supreme Court ruled that detainees are
entitled, at a minimum, to the rights reflected in Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions,100 President Bush signed a new executive order reauthorizing unlawful interrogation tactics such as water-boarding and
the “cold-cell” while furthering his program of coercive interrogation
and secret detention.101 In September 2006, President Bush admitted that
a CIA program had been implemented using secret detention and
“tough” forms of treatment and that the program would continue.102
Later in 2006, Congress enacted the Military Commission Act
(MCA),103 thereby amending the War Crimes Act.104 The MCA was
enacted to further define “torture” prohibited under Common Article 3
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions—a violation of which is a war crime
under international law, the War Crimes Act,105 and other federal
legislation that was not amended and incorporates all of the laws of war
as offenses against the laws of the United States.106 However, the MCA’s
definition does not comply with Article 1 of the CAT, for the following
reasons: (1) the MCA definition applies only to torture of a person in the
perpetrator’s custody or control, whereas the CAT’s definition applies to
any “complicity or participation in torture[]” of any person; (2) the MCA
definition has a limitation with respect to the purposes for which torture
BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 2-3, 136-38 nn.17, 19.
99
Shane, Johnston & Risen, supra note 76, at 1. See also Senate ASC Report, supra note 76,
at xvi (Bradbury testified “that the CIA’s use of waterboarding was ‘adapted from the
SERE training program.’”); House Comm. Report, supra note 79, at 134 (on Feb. 14, 2008,
“Bradbury provided detailed information about . . . the U.S. form of waterboarding”).
100
See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 633, n.63.
101
Shane, Johnson & Risen, supra note 76 (adding that Bradbury had “reviewed and
approved” the 2006 executive order). Bush re-authorized unlawful tactics after their
general outlawry the year before in the Detainee Treatment Act, Title X of the Department
of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 109-48, § 1003(a) 119 Stat. 2680 (2005). Id. (“No
individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States Government,
regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment.”) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd(a)).
102
See, e.g., PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 29.
103
MCA, supra note 58.
104
18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006).
105
Id. at § 2441(c)(3).
106
10 U.S.C. § 818 (2006). See PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 26, at 253–59; Jordan J.
Paust, After My Lai: The Case for War Crime Jurisdiction Over Civilians in Federal District
Courts, 50 TEX. L. REV. 6, 12, at nn.25–26, 11, at n.17, 22, 27, 33 (1971).
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is used, whereas the CAT assures that torture for any purpose is illegal
and lists purposes in a non-exclusive manner (i.e., listing purposes with
the phrase “such as”); and (3) the definition of “severe mental pain or
suffering” in the MCA is limited to the meaning set forth in other U.S.
legislation that the Committee Against Torture has already found to be
in breach of the Convention’s obligation to enact appropriate laws to
cover all forms of torture as well as all forms of cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment.107
It is time for new legislation regarding torture and cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment to reach all forms of such unlawful treatment in
order to comply with the CAT, human rights law (customary and treatybased), the laws of war (customary and treaty-based), and, more
generally, to comply with what the United Nations Security Council and
General Assembly have recognized as the duty of all states to end any
form of impunity for and to prosecute international crime.108 Full
107

See CAT Report, supra note 22, at ¶ 13:
sections 2340 and 2340 A of [title 18 of] the United States Code limit
federal criminal jurisdiction over acts of torture to extraterritorial
cases. The Committee also regrets that, despite the occurrence of cases
of extraterritorial torture of detainees, no prosecutions have been
initiated under the extraterritorial torture statute . . . . [The U.S.]
should enact a federal crime of torture consistent with article 1 of the
Convention . . . to prevent and eliminate acts of torture . . . in all its
forms . . . . [The U.S.] should ensure that acts of psychological
torture . . . are not limited to ‘prolonged mental harm’ as set out in the
State party’s understandings lodged at the time of ratification of the
Convention, but constitute a wider category of acts, which cause
severe mental suffering, irrespective of their prolongation or its
duration.

Id.
The Convention Against Torture mandates that all parties “shall ensure that all acts of
torture are offences under its criminal law[]” and “[t]he same shall apply . . . to an act by
any person which constitutes complicity or participation in torture[]” and, therefore,
whether or not such person has custody or control over the victim. CAT, supra note 20, at
art. 4(1). See also id. art. 1(1) (the crime reaches conduct “inflicted by or at the instigation of
or with the consent or acquiescence of” certain persons, thereby demonstrating that such
persons need not have custody or control of victims). The MCA does not “provide
immunity from prosecution for any criminal offense[.]” MCA, supra note 58, at § 8(b);
PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 261 n.115.
108
See, e.g., supra notes 15–16, 26, 37 and accompanying text. President Obama’s
Executive Order on January 22, 2009 requiring that all U.S. interrogation practices comply,
at a minimum, with the requirements under treaty-based and customary international law
reflected in common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (and, therefore, that all persons
“shall in all circumstances be treated humanely”) and shall comply with the U.S. Army’s
interrogation manual is helpful, but does not lessen the need for new legislation to cover all
forms of participation in torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. See Exec.
Order No. 13, 491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4894 (Jan. 22, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.
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coverage would also allow the United States to exercise a greater
flexibility to request extradition of U.S. and foreign nationals for
prosecution in the United States. Otherwise, U.S. extradition requests for
the return of U.S. nationals and for the custody of foreign nationals can
be denied because of a lack of dual criminality where an alleged offense
is not a crime prosecutable under the laws of the foreign country as the
requested state and the U.S. as the requesting state.109 In such a
circumstance, U.S. nationals will be prosecuted in foreign courts using
foreign procedures110 or rendered to the International Criminal Court
(“ICC”).111 Moreover, the principle of complementarity set forth in
gov/the_press_office/EnsuringLawfulInterrogations. The U.S. Army manual declares that
handling and treatment “must be accomplished in accordance with applicable law and
policy,” which include “U.S. law; the law of war; relevant international law; [and] relevant
directives.” U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY,, FIELD MANUAL NO. 2-22.3, HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTOR OPERATIONS vii (Sept. 6 2006), available at http://www.army.mil/references/
FM2-22.3.pdf. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions provides a minimum
standard of treatment. Id.; PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 43. The manual also
lists specific tactics that must not be used, such as water-boarding, use of extreme cold, use
of dogs, and stripping persons naked and hooding. See PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra
note 1, at 43. Of further interest is the fact that the Executive Order’s requirement of
humane treatment refers to common Article 3 “as a [m]inimum [b]aseline[,]” but notes that
treatment must also be consistent with the requirements of the CAT (which also applies in
times of relative peace) “and other laws regulating the treatment and interrogation of
individuals detained in any armed conflict,” among others. See Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74
Fed. Reg. 4894 at Section 3(a).
109
Concerning the customary dual criminality principle, see, e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET
AL., supra note 26, at 142, 331–32, 334, 348, 351, 353–56, 377. If a U.S. amnesty or immunity
precludes U.S. prosecution, the U.S. must either extradite or render to an international
tribunal. See also supra note 39. One of the worst responses would involve creation of a
farcical “truth commission” where lawyered-up Bush Administration officials who are
reasonably accused would be granted immunity to testify, but would refuse to testify about
secreted meetings, authorizations, findings, directives, and memoranda that the Obama
Administration had still not made public despite claims to transparency. If the U.S. could
not prosecute such persons, the U.S. obligation would shift to a duty to extradite.
Additionally, the U.S. could not assure extradition of such persons from any foreign
country exercising universal jurisdiction and they could be prosecuted in any country they
visited or in which they were otherwise found. They would have no jury trial and, if found
guilty of authorizing or facilitating crime or dereliction of duty, they would most likely
serve their sentence in a foreign jail. As Professor Tony D’Amato remarked, they would
“lose the home court advantage.” Anthony D’Amato, private email to the author.
110
In case of foreign prosecution of U.S. nationals, customary human rights law reflected
in Article 14 of the ICCPR provides a set of minimum due process guarantees. See, e.g.,
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 633 n.66 (2006); PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 26, at 473–74;
PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 105, 113, 126–27.
111
Concerning possible ICC jurisdiction over U.S. nationals, see, e.g., Rome Statute of the
ICC, supra note 21, at arts. 12(2)(a), 13(a) and (c); Jordan J. Paust, The Reach of ICC
Jurisdiction Over Non-Signatory Nationals, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 5-8, 14–15 (2000).
One circumstance that makes ICC jurisdiction possible is where an alleged crime occurs on
the territory of a party to the treaty and that party or any other party renders an accused to
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Article 17 of the Statute of the ICC, which requires suspension of ICC
prosecution when the United States is able to and “genuinely” proceeds
with prosecution in good faith,112 will not be applicable where U.S.
legislation does not cover crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC or for
any other reason the U.S. cannot or will not initiate prosecution of those
who are reasonably accused. One set of federal statutes allows
prosecution of any war crime in the federal district courts,113 but
presently there is no federal legislation allowing prosecution of crimes
against humanity as such. Nonetheless, some crimes against humanity
committed during an armed conflict, such as torture and secret detention
or forced disappearance of individuals, are also war crimes and can be
prosecuted as war crimes.114
It is also time for the United States to withdraw its attempted
reservation to the CAT which had declared erroneously that the U.S.
considers itself bound by the obligation under Article 16
to prevent ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment,’ only insofar as the term ‘cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment’ means the cruel,
unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment
prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.115

the Court. Id. at art. 12(2)(a) (ICC jurisdiction exists if “[t]he State on the territory of which
the conduct in question occurred” is a party). By the end of 2008, there were 108 parties to
the treaty, including Afghanistan. There are no rulings by the ICC yet on point, but it is
otherwise normal under customary international law concerning jurisdiction to recognize
that when an alleged perpetrator outside the territory of a state (e.g., in Washington, D.C.)
intends to produce effects within such state (e.g., Afghanistan) and the relevant conduct
occurs within such state by a co-conspirator, an actual agent, or an unknowing or innocent
“agent” (a mere “agent” by fiction), that the conduct of the latter person is attributed to the
alleged perpetrator just as if the alleged perpetrator engaged in conduct within such state.
See, e.g., PAUST, VAN DYKE & MALONE, supra note 4, at 515–16, 518, 541–42, and cases cited;
PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 26, at 179–83, and cases cited.
112
See Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 21, at art. 17. There is some ambiguity
regarding whether a non-party to the treaty can take advantage of Article 17’s limitation,
but Article 17 might be construed as a limitation of ICC jurisdiction regardless of whether
the state that is able to and genuinely does proceed with prosecution of an offense within
the treaty is a non-party. Furthermore, since nationals of a non-party can be prosecuted
before the ICC under certain circumstances, perhaps the individual accused would have
standing to raise Article 17.
113
See supra notes 103–06 and accompanying text.
114
See, e.g., PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 39–40; supra notes 16–17, 21 and
accompanying text.
115
Reservation No. 1, available at 136 CONG. REC. S17486-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
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The Committee Against Torture under the auspices of the CAT has
recognized that, if operative, the putative reservation (which technically
is phrased merely as a unilateral understanding that happens to be in
plain error and could be withdrawn) would result in a failure to cover all
violations of the Convention and that, therefore, the attempted
reservation is “in violation of the Convention[.]”116 As in the case of any
attempted reservation that is inconsistent with the object and purpose of
a treaty, the attempted reservation is void ab initio as a matter of law and
has no legal effect.117 Thus, it cannot protect the United States or any
U.S. national but, as is the case with other void attempted reservations to
human rights treaties, it communicates a lack of meaningful commitment
to human rights. President Obama can act now to notify the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations (as the depository for the treaty) that the
United States formally withdraws its attempted reservation because it is
void as a matter of law. Such an act by the President would help to end
an embarrassment for the United States and restore U.S. integrity and
respect as a country committed to human dignity and human rights.
Concomitantly, President Obama can notify the Secretary-General of the
U.S. withdrawal of the same type of putative, but void, reservation to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.118
116
See, e.g., PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, BEYOND THE LAW, at 189–91 n.59 (also
addressing a U.N. Experts’ Report that agreed with the decision of the CAT Committee).
The attempted limitation or false understanding is also incompatible with customary, jus
cogens, and U.N. Charter obligations regarding cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment
that pertain in any event. See supra text accompanying notes 3–6.
117
See PAUST, supra note 1, at 143–44 n.43, 189–90 n.59; See Nowak, supra note 69, at 836;
PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 143–44 n.43, 189–91 n.59. An attempted
declaration of non-self-execution of Articles 1–16 is also inconsistent with the object and
purpose of the CAT, since several of the articles are phrased in mandatory “shall” language
that is typically self-executing. The declaration should also be withdrawn.
118
See Reservation No. 3, available at 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01 (daily ed. April 2, 1992);
Nowak, supra note 69, at 836; PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 143 n.42, 189–91
n.59 (also addressing a U.N. Experts’ Report agreeing with the conclusion of the Human
Rights Committee that operates under the auspices of the ICCPR that the attempted
reservation is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the treaty and is void ab initio as a
matter of law). While doing so, President Obama can also withdraw the declaration of
partial non-self-execution from the U.S. instrument of ratification regarding the ICCPR
because it is also disingenuous and void ab initio as a matter of law. See, e.g., PAUST,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 26, at 363–66, 368, 376–78
(quoting H.R. Comm., General Comment No. 24, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/REV.1/Add.6 (2
Nov. 1994)). Some do not understand that it was only an attempted declaration of partial
non-self-execution and never reached Article 50 of the ICCPR which mandates in clear selfexecuting language that all of “[t]he provisions of the present Covenant shall extend to all
parts of federal States without any limitations or exceptions.” ICCPR, supra note 33, at art.
50. See PAUST, VAN DYKE & MALONE, supra note 4, at 87–89, 507–08; PAUST, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 26, at 361–62. In any event, we cannot lead
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VII. CONCLUSION
It is time for real change in America. It is time to restore the rule of
law; to bring an end to seven years of impunity that must be effectuated
through Executive prosecution or extradition of all who are reasonably
accused; and to restore American honor, integrity, and respect within the
international community.119 At this defining moment in our history,
none of these critically needed outcomes can be accomplished by new
commission or committee reports.120 Ultimately, they can only be
in human rights if some of our own rights are held in chains.
119
Concerning various damaging consequences of the Bush Administration’s program of
serial and cascading criminality, see, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Serial War Crimes in Response to
Terrorism Can Pose Threats to National Security, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2009)
(addressing the placing of our people in harm’s way, mission failure, aid to the enemy, and
deflation of authority, our values, law and power, among other consequences). If for any
reason the United States fails to prosecute or extradite those who are reasonably accused,
the U.S. would remain in violation of critically important treaties and various damaging
consequences will continue. Among several abnegative consequences would be a general
deflation of respect for the rule of law (especially the laws of war) and doubt within the
community whether the United States will fulfill its commitments under other treaties that
are of great significance to the international community.
120
New investigations should not be used to postpone prosecution or extradition of those
who are already reasonably accused. At most, they would delay the need for President
Obama to exercise his constitutionally-based duty to prosecute or extradite those who are
later identified as persons reasonably accused of international crime. Presently, there is
extensive evidence of manifest criminality engaged in by several individuals and many
authoritative reports, published paper trails, and admissions already exist. See, e.g., PAUST,
BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 5–20, 25–30, 32, 35–36, 45–46; supra notes 19, 21–22, 73,
76–80, 107 and accompanying text. They offer proof that what we saw in Abu Ghraib
photos and water-boarding, the cold cell, stripping persons naked and use of snarling dogs
to instill intense fear are torture authorized and abetted at the highest levels. If they were
not torture, they are cruel treatment. If they were not, they constitute inhumane treatment.
As such, they are manifest violations of the laws of war and any violation of the laws of
war is a war crime. It is time to move beyond what for some has been convenient disbelief
and for others has been racist indifference.
A great President must surely realize that we cannot restore the rule of law, we cannot
adequately train soldiers to obey the laws of war, we cannot properly move forward
without complying with international law and ending impunity through Executive
prosecution or extradition of those who are reasonably accused. We must reaffirm the
fundamental expectations of the Founders and Framers and countless others here and
abroad that no one is above the law—that law exists not merely for those who are outside
of government and without substantial wealth or power. See PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW,
supra note 1, at xi–xii, 20–23, 65–67, 71–76, 80–81, 86–91, 99; Jordan J. Paust, In Their Own
Words: Affirmations of the Founders, Framers, and Early Judiciary Concerning the Binding Nature
of the Customary Law of Nations, 14 U.C.DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 205, 205, Et seq. (2008).
Former President Bush and others in his Administration have created a major crisis here
and abroad with respect to our commitment to the rule of law and consequences for the
integrity of government that would only be exacerbated if President Obama does not
reaffirm that public servants are bound by the law and, whether or not it is comfortable,
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accomplished by adherence to the express and unavoidable
constitutional duty of the President of the United States faithfully to
execute the laws,121 including customary and treaty-based international
law that requires prosecution or extradition of those who authorized,
ordered, abetted, or engaged in torture and other forms of illegal
treatment of human beings. Never in the long history of the United
States has there been such widespread serial criminality authorized and
abetted at the highest levels of our government. Never in the history of
our country has any other President been known to have authorized war
crimes and crimes against humanity.

that he will faithfully execute the laws of the United States, which include treaty-based and
customary international legal duties to either initiate prosecution or extradite. It has been
left to President Obama to make the decision to end the seven-year trajectory of impunity.
It is not a decision for committees, politics, and compromises, but of law.
121
U.S. Const., art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed[.]”).
For support that such laws include treaties and customary international law and the
President is bound thereby, see, e.g., PAUST, supra note 26, at 169–73, and numerous cases
cited; PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 20–23, 72–75, 86, 87–89, 92, 124–25, 168–72
nn.179–195, 233–37 nn.3–5, 20. Every relevant judicial opinion since the beginning of the
United States has recognized that the President and all within the Executive branch are
bound by the laws of war, a point famously recognized by President Lincoln’s Attorney
General in 1865 while addressing the need to prosecute war crimes and the lack of
congressional power to limit the reach of the laws of war. See, e.g., Op. Att’y Gen. 297, 298–
300, 307–08 (1865); PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 234–36 n.4; 11. International
laws that President Obama must faithfully execute at the beginning of the creation of his
legacy include the unavoidable obligation to initiate prosecution of or to extradite all
persons of any status who are reasonably accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and crimes under the CAT. See, e.g., supra notes 26, 28, 31 and accompanying text.
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